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ARTICLES
THE NEXUM: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR
SELF-GUARDIANSHIP BY CONTRACT:
A SYSTEM OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND




The term commonly used to describe government provision and
funding for the care of persons with serious mental illness is the
"mental health system." Unfortunately, forty years of deinstitutionali-
zation and many years of court-imposed crypto-criminal procedures on
individuals with mental illness has deconstructed the system and cre-
ated an anti-therapeutic, adversarial environment. The mental health
system needs to be restructured in a way that is consistent with mod-
em scientific knowledge about mental illness, With national policies
that promote patient autonomy and alternatives to current judicial dis-
pute resolution. This paper proposes a new system of informed con-
sent for persons who require assistance in managing their mental ill-
ness. It creates a form of self-guardianship by an advance directive
contract. This new alternative system, utilizing a contractual approach,
is called the "Nexum."'
Director of the Law and Psychiatry Center and Associate Clinical
Professor of Law and Psychiatry at George Mason University School of
Law. I would like to acknowledge and thank William A. Carnahan, Esq. for
his conceptual and editorial assistance in this thesis. I would also like to
thank Rosanna M. Esposito, Esq. and Rodney Sweetland, Esq. for their re-
search and editorial assistance.
1. A "nexum" was the first contractual relationship created under Roman
Law, see infra note 135. For purposes of this article, severe mental illness is
defined here to include schizophrenia and bipolar/manic or bipolar affective
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Among the untoward consequences of current mental health laws
and policies is the increase in both the number of mentally ill appear-
ing in the nation's prisons and jails, and among the homeless popula-
tion. 2 These individuals also experience the loss of the ability to live
freely and productively in their community. Reforms of the last forty
years, including de-institutionalization, court-mandated due process,
and a substantial increase in available legal advocacy, were meant to
serve patient interests, but in reality, the results act against both the
privacy of the patient and the public interests of society by pitting
civil rights concerns against necessary therapeutic intervention.
One of the most impo*rtant issues at the center of this contemporary
controversy over mental illness is that of compelled treatment for pa-
tients lacking the fundamental awareness of their mental illness or
their need and suitability for treatment. Diametrically opposed forces
have battled over the appropriateness and conditions under which
treatment may be compelled for persons with mental illness, a fight in
which courts have become a major forum. Following the tradition of
court activism of the 1950's, thirty years of mental health litigation
has produced a myriad of judicially mandated due process principles.
This court activism has changed public mental health treatment from
primarily a "medical model" into one that mirrors a "legal model" of
care and treatment. Indeed, even beyond a mere legal model, the
model of due process has been largely a crypto-criminal procedure.
Because of the intensified adversarial roles and the generally overbur-
dened court system, large amounts of time, resources, and energy have
been devoted to legal activities rather than medical ameliorations. This
obviously does not alleviate mental illness and is not conducive to a
therapeutic alliance between the patient, the physician, and the health
care treatment system. Thus, in the interests of what is understood as
the protection of civil rights, the courts have unwittingly created sub-
stantial barriers to treatment that often diminish patient automony and
exacerbate the condition of their illness.
Ironically, these developments have proved acceptable to govern-
mental mental health bureaucracies due to intense efforts to cut treat-
disorders.
2. See U.S. Department of Justice, Report NCJ 175687, Prisoners in
1998, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, (Aug. 1998); see also E. FULLER




ment costs of the most seriously mentally ill. While persons with se-
vere mental illness often require more intensive supervision and serv-
ices due to their general lack of insight, this treatment is expensive to
provide. Moreover, the patient with severe mental illness is often
highly resistant to psychiatric treatment. Finally, there are substantial
legal liabilities for treatment providers which represent a perverse
disincentive to treatment.
This article drafts a blueprint for a systemic approach to treating se-
rious mental illness based on science, sound social policy, and modem
methods of dispute resolution. This system uses traditional contractual
principles as the foundation for permitting the patient and physician to
jointly address circumstances of decisional impairment caused by
mental illness. The patient will be given an opportunity to participate
in predefining both the terms of his or her decision-making incapacity
and the professionally acceptable treatments that are mutually believed
to be in his or her best interests. The treatment system will reap the
benefits of being able to render treatment under a medical model, i.e.,
without having to resort to courts of law for authorization or validation
of clinical judgments where a patient is competent to give informed
consent on expeditious and appropriate treatment. In the event that
disputes arise over the Nexum agreement, legal issues, changing con-
ditions, or a patient's best interests, this system will utilize alternative
dispute resolution methods to quickly resolve the issues while pro-
tecting all legal rights under current federal and state laws.
Designing a new system specifically aimed at maximizing patient
autonomy, effective treatment, and reduced costs, while relieving an
overburdened court system, should produce distinct benefits for all
concerned. The primary goals of this system would be to enhance the
autonomy and dignity of the patient, while largely eliminating the role
of the judiciary which has, in many instances, inappropriately insinu-
ated itself into the therapeutic relationship between the patient and his
doctor.
In this system, the patient, in consultation with his pysician, will
choose among legally and professionally acceptable options on three
issues. First, under contractual principles, the patient will, with medi-
cal and legal advice, define the terms of his or her decision-making in-
competence within legally acceptable principles, based upon an
authorizing statute and professionally acceptable medical standards.
Second, pursuant to authorization by statute and the express terms of
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the Nexum contract, the patient will give prospectively informed con-
sent for defined treatments while granting implied consent for other
treatments under a physician's discretion, that will address any unan-
ticipated circumstances which the patient's mental illness might pro-
duce at the time that treatment is rendered.
Third, and the most unique component of the Nexum system which
takes it beyond other advance directive statutes for persons with men-
tal illness, is the incorporation of a statutorily authorized alternative
dispute resolution program to resolve disagreements, to make inter-
pretations of contractual terms, to resolve disputes, or to recognize
changes in the circumstances or other unforeseen problems surround-
ing a patient's mental health treatment. Under this dispute resolution
program appropriate treatment can be legally authorized. Modeled af-
ter the Surrogate Decision Making Committee (SDMC) system in New
York State,3 an administrative adjudicative panel composed of a phy-
sician or a nurse, a lawyer, and two patient advocates or family mem-
bers familiar with the issues and concerns of persons who have serious
mental illness may decide issues of decision-making competency and
appropriate medical treatment for a patient. SDMC has already proven
effective in protecting patient rights, garnering the trust of patients,
providers, the bureaucracy and the judiciary, and also successful in
minimizing delay, costs, and appeals to courts of law.4 Although
SDMC does not currently include advance directive disputes in its ju-
risdiction, the system makes effective and relatively error-free deter-
minations of patient decision-making competency and the patient's
best interests in matters of major medical care that are essentially the
same as might arise under a Nexum.
I. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
During the last two millennia of western thought, law and custom
assigned to governments two primary functions covering subjects with
mental illness in need of care and treatment. Under its police power, a
3. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW, ARTICLE 80.
4. See Clarence J. Sundram and Paul F. Stavis, New York's Surrogate
Decision Making Law - Ten Years Later, 22 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY. 107
(1999); Originally created in New York State, this approach has been repli-
cated in one other state. See TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. TITLE 7,
ch. 59 (West 1999).
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government must maintain the social order against any potential or
actual dangers by a person due to mental disorder. Secondly, under its
parens patriae power, the government may attempt to restore the per-
son's decision-making ability by ameliorating the mental illness.
5
The right of autonomy over body and mind under law is fundamen-
tally justified by a person's mental "competence" to exercise rights
and privileges. Here, it is discussed as a legal concept.6 Until recently,
the definition of mental illness has been a concept constructed from
the culture and science of the era, though in previous ages it was
thought to be caused by a possession by demons, reversion to an ani-
malistic level of behavior, or a punishment from God. Although Hip-
pocrates was one of the first to postulate that mental illness had bio-
logical or organic causes, many cultures believed mental illness origi-
nated from spiritual and mystical causes. Hippocrates thought that a
place of asylum, where individuals would have a minimum level of
mental stress and purity of air and water, would be appropriate treat-
ment. Yet, the Greeks and most other cultures recognized that to exer-
cise rights, one must not endanger oneself or others. If the purposes of
society were self-preservation for the whole and for the individuals of
society, then the survival of its members would be tenuous indeed if it
5. "Parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country" and refers to
the traditional role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons with a le-
gal disability to protect their health and welfare, especially for mentally dis-
abled persons and infants. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed.
1990).
6. Competence is a legal and philosophical concept, not necessarily a
clinical methodology for assessment. Courts decide whether a person is
"competent" or "incompetent" to exercise legal rights; clinicians and other ex-
perts devise methods to demonstrate whether a person had adequate abilities to
make appropriate decisions. See Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psy-
chotropic Medications: Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 689, 692-94 (1993). Yet, the law also delegates respon-
sibility to attorneys and physicians to make determinations of a person's men-
tal competence. Before physicians obtain "informed consent" for any major
medical procedure, the physician must first determine if the patient has a
sound mind to give it. See Robert P. Roca, Determining Decisional Capacity:
A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1178, 1190 (1994). For attor-
neys, there is an obligation to determine whether a client is competent in order
to represent him "zealously," or incompetent, which makes a search for a deci-
sion-maker necessary and a "best interests" representation appropriate until
one is found. See American Bar Association Code of Ethics, § 7.
1999]
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permitted people to do potentially hazardous and deadly activities
without the ability to appreciate the risks or consequences. Of course,
protection from such decision-making incompetence is most clearly
and universally applicable to children of minor age, who have histori-
cally been closely protected and considered per se unable to make
certain decisions such as marriage, contracting, sexual practices, and
consenting to medical care, until the age of adulthood.
For a person capable of moral and behavioral judgments, the ques-
tion of whether he or she behaved responsibly was a question that
would be addressed by the criminal or civil law. However, someone
incapable of responsible acts might not be answerable to the law or
society. Following Greek and Roman law, the common law subse-
quently developed what can be called "absolving conditions" of civil
law and "excusing conditions" of criminal law.8
Civil law absolutions included removal of the rights and forgiveness
of the obligations of contract, marriage and testamentary gifts. These
were "absolving conditions" of civil law because they removed exist-
ing responsibilities that were already encumbered or that the law
would otherwise have imposed in terms of contract, testamentary gifts,
and marriage. The criminal law excuses a person from standing trial,
exonerated culpability through the insanity defense, and prohibited
execution. These conditions totally excuse ab initio the person from
any obligation, even to participate in legal proceedings. The inability
to stand trial means results in no trial. Insanity during the commission
of a crime precludes assignment of criminal culpability. Insanity, even
after a verdict, prevents the defendant from capital punishment.9
7. There have been exceptions to this doctrine in recent years, generally
known as the "mature minor" doctrine. Under it, children of minor age are
given limited rights to consent to certain types of medical care, such as testing
for sexually transmitted diseases, mental health care, contraception and abor-
tion. See generally Joan-Margaret Kun, Rejecting the Adage "Children Should
be Seen and Not Heard": The Mature Minor Doctrine, 16 PACE L. REv. 423
(1996).
8. H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND
FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 81-104 (Sidney Hook, ed., 1958).
9. See WILLIAM A. CARNAHAN & JACK ZUSSMAN, MENTAL HEALTH:
NEW YORK LAW AND PRACTICE, passim Chapters 14-22 (1976). These catego-
ries of "absolving" and "excusing" conditions are an heuristic created by the
author. They are not discussed as such in this two volume work, but rather are
distilled from the theoretical framework of legal rights of the mentally dis-
[Vol. 16:1
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Greek mythology tells a story of what could be the first "insanity
defense." In the myth called The Madness of Hercules the Strongman
and Adventurer, Hercules, as one of the numerous illegitimate, demi-
god progenies of Zeus, the King of the gods, is driven insane by Zeus'
wife and kills his own family. During his lifetime, Hera, Zeus' wife,
hounded and hunted Hercules because Hercules very existence, as the
illegitimate offspring of her husband, shamed her. Hera wanted to de-
stroy Hercules as a living symbol of Zeus' infidelity. She cast a spell
of madness upon Hercules, which caused Hercules to kill his wife and
three children, despite his total devotion to them. After this horrible
spectacle, witnessed by the townspeople, Hercules was so bewildered
that he had no inkling of what happened to his family. But, when he
learned the truth that he killed them himself, he said, "[A]nd I myself
am the murderer of my dearest."'1 As a result of this realization he be-
came suicidal. Yet, the townspeople stopped him by saying, "[Y]ou
were out of your mind."" The community believed that Hercules was
not responsible and Hercules eventually returned to sober reason and
sorrowful acceptance of his fate due to the friendship and caring of the
community:
Theseus, the thinker, rejected the idea that a man could
be guilty of [M]urder when he had not known what he
was doing and that those who helped such a one could
be reckoned defiled. The Athenians agreed and wel-
comed the poor hero. But [Hercules] himself could not
understand such ideas. He could not think the thing out
at all; he could only feel. He had killed his family.
abled presented in it. See also The Insanity Defense in New York, A Report to
Gov. Hugh L. Carey (William A. Carnahan ed., 1978). Although guardianship
is a long recognized power of the state that can be imposed on children of mi-
nor age or the mentally disabled, it is neither an absolving nor an excusing
condition of law. Rather, guardianship is a fiduciary relationship meant to
preserve autonomy or the enjoyment of legal rights and privileges notwith-
standing the decision-making impairment due to age or illness. Thus, it should
also be noted that civil commitment of the mentally ill can be considered a
form of guardianship by the state pursuant to its parens patriae powers.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 103 (1992) (Thomas, J. dissenting, uses this
concept, saying: "Insanity, in other words is an affirmative defense that does
not negate the State's proof, but merely 'exempt['s the defendant] from crimi-
nal responsibility"').
10. EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 162 (1942).
11. Id.
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Therefore, he was defiled and a defiler of others.'
2
This story provides an early example in Western thought and cul-
ture of one of the "excusing" conditions later found in criminal law. It
is also happens to be an example of the parens patriae power of the
community that offered care and treatment and refused to punish Her-
cules. Although Hercules perpetrated criminal acts, the community
excused Hercules from the consequences because he committed the
crimes without knowledge or volition due to mental illness.
Both Roman and English law provide examples of mental illness in
mitigating punishment. Ancient Roman law contained both "excusing"
conditions of the criminal law and "absolving" conditions of civil law,
both based on mental disability. The absolving conditions in Roman
law covered contract, marriage, and testamentary gifts. Roman law
also provided for guardianship to provide a substitute decision-maker
through a government magistrate ("curator") for persons who were
mentally disabled.' 3 Under English law, the King, as sovereign, was
the legal guardian of all "lunatics" and "idiots.' 4 For a person deemed
insane, the King became the guardian of the person and his property,
but was obliged to relinquish control back to the person upon the re-
turn or restoration of his sanity.'5
Over the last two centuries, philosophy and law has seen the en-
hancement of personal autonomy and rights that are granted and pro-
tected by the government. Consistently throughout this time period,
the law predicated the legitimate exercise of personal and property
rights upon sanity, or having a sound mind. Generally, the legal term
for this is "competency." Being "mentally incompetent" meant that a
person theoretically had a personal or property right, but did not have
the physical or mental capacity to exercise such rights with the level
of responsibility that society required in its laws and customs.' 6 Ac-
cordingly, absence of "sound mind" has been justification for a loss of
liberty, or a loss of the enjoyment of property.
12. Id. at 162-63.
13. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL et al., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
9-10(1985).
14. 1d.
15. See id. at 10.
16. "Legal incapacity": This expression implies that the person in view has
the right vested in him, but is prevented by some impediment from exercising
it; as in the case of minors, committed persons, prisoners, etc. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed.).
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The concept of mental competency required for the exercise of per-
sonal rights was an unarticulated premise of eighteenth century En-
lightenment and American pre-Revolutionary thought. The concept
implied that a person could be held responsible for his actions because
he had the potential or ability to act responsibly.1 7 In this regard, both
the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence reflect Scottish
and French eighteenth century Enlightenment thinking."
In the United States, legal competency generally consists of three
elements: knowledge, reasoning, and voluntariness.' 9 These basic ele-
ments are found in Aristotle's works, where he defines their true na-
ture by the characteristics that distinguished them.
Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a
man acts unjustly or Justly whenever he does such acts
voluntarily; when involuntary, he Acts neither unjustly
or justly except in an incidental way; for he does things
which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act is or
is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by
its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it is vol-
untary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act
17. See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION VOL II,
563-568 (3d ed. 1967).
18. See BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 25 (1977).
19. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389,400-402 n.12 (1993); see gener-
ally Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas
Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Study I: Mental Illness and Competence to
Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 110 (1995). These articles
and studies use somewhat different formulations of the legal elements of com-
petence or ability to consent. Despite most of the variations, they can all be
essentially reduced into the three classic elements of knowing, intelligence,
and voluntariness. For example, the well regarded MacArthur study adds a
further element to these three, described as "appreciation" by the patient of the
mental illness and possible treatment. Although clearly "appreciation" had
statistical significance in terms of refining patient characteristics, it nonethe-
less can surely be considered a subdivision of intelligence, i.e. the ability to
reason. See Kathleen Cranley Glass, Refining Definitions and Devising In-
struments: Two Decades of Assessing Mental Competence, 20 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY. 5, 12 (1997). Other variations in these formulations specify ob-
vious or implied requirements such as the ability to communicate that decision
to others and the necessity that the medical treatment provider knows about the
personal choice.
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of injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust
but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not pre-
sent as well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said
before, any of the things in a man's own power which
he does with knowledge, i.e., not in ignorance either of
the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the
end that will be attained.2 °
Thus, the existence of a rationale mind distinguished mankind from
other animals, thus defining mankind as the "rational" animal.2 ' Aris-
totle further postulates that the idea of justice, based on individual re-
sponsibility, originated in a person's decision-making competency.
Without it, a man could not act responsibly, and therefore could not be
held responsible.
The Enlightenment philosophers revived Aristotelian thought and
weaved it into the fabric of legal thinking in England, France and the
United States. For example, Rousseau believed that autonomy of the
person was a matter of the grand Social Contract, whereby each per-
son submits to norms freely as a member of the community.2 2 This
idea was expressed by Cicero, who stated that "[c]itizens are self-
obedient to the rule of law in the social contract so that they may be
free within the order that is created. 23 The Social Contract is a bal-
ance in the sense that a citizen who is unable to exercise legal rights
due to mental disability is not only absolved or excused from legal
obligations, but is also eligible for treatment or custodial care from the
government as "parent of the country" under natural law concepts. The
authority of governments in Western thought and culture, and one in-
herent in the laws of the United, States, is not only to care for persons
with an inability to make decisions, but also to nurture and encourage
that decision-making process where it is feasible. 24 As guardian-at-
large for children and mentally incompetent persons, to promote
20. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1015, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Robert McKeon ed., 1966).
21. THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 12-13 (Sir David Ross
trans. 1963).
22. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 298 (1962).
23. "Legum servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus." Oratio pro Cluentio;
Aristotle wrote: "Men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule
of the constitution; for it is their salvation. (Politics 131 Oa). Id. at 288, 316 n.
19,22.
24. Cf Younbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982).
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treatment of individuals and enhance public safety, governments have
established surrogate decision making systems to promote autonomy
among its citizens. Originally, it was the King or his appointee. Now
the courts play this role in situations of excusing and absolving condi-
tions of both civil and criminal law, such as nullifying a contract, a
marriage, consenting for major medical procedures, etc.
In terms of fundamental principles of American jurisprudence, John
Locke is considered one of the most influential pre-Enlightenment
thinkers. Locke accurately analyzed the jurisprudential principles of
surrogate decision-making in the context of the parental obligation to
children and the government's obligation for those adults with deci-
sion-making incapacity:
The Power, then, that Parents have over their Children,
arises from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to
take care of their Off-spring, during the imperfect state
of Childhood. To inform the Mind, and govern the Ac-
tions of their yet ignorant Nonage, till Reason shall
take its place, and ease them of that Trouble, is what
the Children want, and the Parents are bound to. For
God having given Man an Understanding to direct his
actions, has allowed him a freedom of Will, and liberty
of Acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the
bounds of that Law he is under ... And so Lunaticks
and Ideots are never set free from the Government of
their Parents; Children, who are not as yet come unto
those years whereat they may have; and Innocents
which are excluded by a natural defect from ever hav-
ing; Thirdly, Madmen, which for the present cannot
possibly have the use of right Reason to guide them-
25. "Locke was the great practical success; the new English and America
regimes founded themselves according to his instructions ... The notion that
man possesses inalienable natural rights, that they belong to him as an individ-
ual prior, both in time and in sanctity to any civil society, and that civil socie-
ties exist for and acquire their legitimacy from ensuring those rights, is an in-
vention of modem philosophy... Hobbes initiated the notion of rights, and it
was given its greatest respectability by Locke ... [T]he whole world is divided
into two parts, one of which traces its intellectual lineage back to Locke and
the other to Marx, and the latter is much readier to acknowledge its parent than
is the former." ALAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 162,
165, and 217 (1987); Historian Louis Hartz holds that Locke: "dominates
American thought as no thinker anywhere dominates the political thought of a
nation." Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 140 (1955).
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selves, have for their Guide, the Reason that guideth
other Men which are Tutors over them, to seek and
procure their good for them, says Hooker, Eccl. Pol.
Lib. 1, Sect. 7. All which seems no more than that
Duty, which God and Nature has laid on Man as well as
other Creatures; to preserve their Off-Spring, till they
can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce
amount to an instance or proof of Parents Regal
Authority. 6
Legally and culturally, sanity was based on the capability of right
reason. 27 This Lockean idea has been long considered part of the his-
toric power of the states' obligation "to protect persons under legal
disabilities to act for themselves [and] to act as the "general guardian
of all infants, idiots and lunatics., 28 Yet the state not only has an obli-
gation of care in restoring citizens to rational thought under its parens
patriae power, but also has an interest in promoting, and in some cases
requiring the rational behavior of citizens by imposing sanctions for
unreasonable behavior. The King's parens patriae powers were exer-
cised in the courts of equity, powers which evolved from the ecclesi-
astical courts of the Roman Catholic Church. These courts of equity
exercised jurisdiction to decide if a person was either mentally ill
(known as being "mad" or a "lunatic") or mentally retarded ("idiot"),
thereby designating the king to provide care for the person or the per-
son's estate. For those found incompetent due to mental illness, con-
trol of the estate returned to the individual once he regained sanity.
Implicit in evolving American constitutionalism during the late-
eighteenth century is the Enlightenment's unarticulated premise that
mentally incompetent citizens were not denied their rights as a citizen.
For without the ability to reason, to exercise responsibility or to make
intelligent choices, exercising liberties made no sense. Rather, such
persons needed protection from the hazards and consequences of self-
execution of their rights. The law did not permanently deny such
26. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348-352 (Peter Laslett
ed., 1965) (written approximately 1690, although there is some dispute within
a three-year period).
27. See Brakel, supra note 13, at 10-14; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. at 257.
28. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.




rights, but rather postponed the exercise of rights or transferred them
to surrogates or fiduciaries acting in the person's best interests. Legal
rights were inextricably linked to social responsibility, and the inabil-
ity to act responsibly inherently necessitated the invocation of the po-
lice power or parental power of the state.
By the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, in his essay On
Liberty, had finally articulated the theretofore unarticulated Enlight-
enment premise that a person must be capable of rational decision-
making in order to exercise liberty:
That the only purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a civilized commu-
nity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forebear because it will be better for him to do so, be-
cause it will make him happier, because, in the opin-
ions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating
him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with
any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part,
which merely concerns him, his independence is, of
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign. 29
Some commentators use Mill's statement to argue that a future
commitment to restore competency does not increase liberty, but
rather represents a form of "self-paternalism.030 This distorts Mill's
philosophy by taking it out of an important context that appears in the
subsequent sentence. It contains Mill's caveat that the limits on the
29. See THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 961 (Edwin A.
Burtt, ed. Modem Library 1967) (1859).
30. See e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal
and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 777, 787 (1982); Lester J. Perling, Comment, Health Care Ad-
vance Directives: Implications for Florida Mental Health Patients, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 193, n. 1 (1993) (supporting advance directives for psychiatric
care).
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state's compulsory power is predicated on a person being a mature
adult who has soundness of mind. "It is perhaps hardly necessary to
say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties.'
It was assumed by most seventeenth to nineteenth century European
thinkers, such as Hegel, Kant, Rousseau, Locke, and Mill, that the
concept of liberty by definition involves a rational or intelligent choice
based upon enlightened self-interest to be able to act responsibly.
32
Legal rights did not have meaning to persons who were mentally im-
paired and unable to make rational decisions. This applied universally
to a minor-aged child per se. This state was equated in law, as it is to-
day, to someone with a judgment-impairing mental disability. How
can someone exercise liberty if incapable of rational decision-making?
How can it be a "massive deprivation of liberty" if the state seeks to
restore a person's ability to exercise decision-making and liberty, or
undertakes to assist someone, parens patriae, to exercise decisions in
his or her best interests?
To the pragmatists, and the early natural law adherents who helped
frame the Constitution, there was virtually absolute liberty to think
and express any thoughts, no matter how irrational. However, no right
existed to act irrationally. Responsibility and freedom based upon a
person's free will and sanity were inextricably linked in thought and
law. This formed the common view of the founding fathers and the
political thinkers of that time, such as Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of
the Declaration of Independence, member of the Constitutional Con-
vention, and father of American psychiatry. He expressed the view of
that era by describing a person with serious mental illness as "incapa-
ble of acting either freely, or from necessity ... they have no will of
their own. This is strictly true."
33
31. See THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 29, at 956.
32. See Mike Startup, Awareness of Own and Others Schizophrenic Ill-
ness, 26 SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH 299-304 (1997).
33. Benjamin Rush, DISEASES OF THE MIND 268-69 (originally published
in 1812) (The Classics of Medicine Library 1979). Dr. Rush, as both a psy-
chiatrist and political thinker of the times, stated, "Let it not be said, that con-
fining such [mentally ill] persons in a hospital would be an infringement upon
personal liberty, incompatible with the freedom of our governments." Id. at
267. Dr. Rush also believed in due process of law, adding: "To prevent injus-
tice or oppression, no person should be sent to the contemplated hospital, or
Sobber House, without being examined and committed by a court." Id. at 268.
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With Locke, Mill and other kindred thinkers of the era, there existed
a belief in an unreserved right to think and speak. However, as Mill
said, "[n]o one pretends that actions should be as free as opinion....
The liberty of the individuals must be thus far limited; he must not
make himself a nuisance to other people." 34 This belief, that there ex-
isted a relationship between individual rights and society's rights was
not mutually exclusive, but rather a balance. He continued:
No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible
for a person to do anything seriously or permanently
hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least to
his near connections, and often far beyond them .... If
he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not
only brings evil upon all who depend on him for any
portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for
rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-
creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burden on their
affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were
very frequent, hardly an offense that is committed
would detract more from the general sum of good....
And even (it will be added) if the consequences of mis-
conduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless
individual, ought society to abandon to their own guid-
ance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection
against themselves is confessedly due to children and
persons under age, is not society equally bound to af-
ford it to persons of mature years who are equally inca-
pable of self-government? . . . There must be some
length of time and amount of experience after which a
moral or prudential truth may be regarded as estab-
lished: and it is merely desired to prevent generation
after generation from falling over the same precipice
which has been fatal to their predecessors. 35
Accordingly, Mill said that "[n]o person ought to be punished for
being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being
drunk on duty." 36 An identical principle forms the basis for the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Texas.37 The Court held
that while one could not constitutionally be punished for being a
34. THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 29, at 992.
35. Id. at 1012.
36. Id.
37. 392 U.S. 514 (1968), reh'g denied 393 U.S. 898 (1968).
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drunk, the state has a right to punish uncontrollable drunkenness that
offends the public order.3a Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing without
dissent, gave tacit recognition to the work of philosophers such as Ar-
istotle, Locke and Mill. He wrote:
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of
the collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts,
which the common law has utilized to assess the moral
accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds.
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mis-
take, justification, and duress have historically pro-
vided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of
the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical views of the nature of man.39
There is a strong public interest for the state to elicit promises from
certain individuals to continue their course of medical treatment. Be-
haviors in public subject to reasonable state control include not only
dangerous or hazardous ones, but also those that might generally of-
fend the "moral and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the
public." 40 If a state can punish an individual for permitting his condi-
tion to become uncontrollable, socially unacceptable behavior in pub-
lic, surely it can use non-criminal civil law powers to persuade men-
tally ill individuals, already receiving treatment in the community, to
take medically acceptable steps to control their behavior.
II. PSYCHIATRIC CONTEXT
The use of the term "intermittently mentally ill" refers to an inden-
tifiable group of persons with severe mental illness who are capable of
living in the community with support, but who periodically experience
mental decompensation, loss of decision-making ability, impairment
38. See id. at 535.
39. Id.
40. "[Texas] has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for public
behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for ap-
pellant and for members of the general public, and which offends the moral
and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community. This seems a
far cry from convicting one for being an addict, being a chronic alcoholic, be-




of insight into the onset of their illness, or a lack of appreciation for
their need of treatment. Most such individuals, with proper counseling,
appropriate psychiatric treatment, and an appropriately drafted mental
health advance directive, can be given a self-guardianship of their
condition even during periods of mental decompensation. The Nexum
incorporates the concept of a mental health advance directive now
found in the laws of twelve states,4' but goes beyond its unilateral na-
ture by adding both a promise of loyalty from the treatment system, as
well as an outstanding alternative dispute resolution system to instill
patient trust in the system. With this option, many individuals can
maintain greater control over their lives, obtain more effective and in-
expensive care, while avoiding the trauma and other disadvantages of
rehospitalization. Also avoided are court adjudication of incompe-
tency, and perhaps, slipping into the criminal justice system. And,
there are positive quid pro quo's that show how building patient trust
encourages participation, reinforces a therapeutic alliance, minimizes
conflict, and maximizes cooperation where there is mutuality of trust,
understanding, and appropriate treatment.
.After two centuries of institutionally based care, and the dramatic
changes in the last four decades of moving from institutional care to
community based programs in mental health treatment, the beginning
of the Twenty-First century is an appropriate time to call for a new
paradigm of patient rights to obtain and select among a variety of ap-
propriate levels of patient care. Because of new medications and the
establishment of a greater variety of community programs, the para-
digm should no longer focus on the chronic or long-term hospitalized
patient, but rather the "intermitently mentally ill" patient. 42 This rec-
41. See infra, Chart, Advance Psychiatric Directive State Statutes.
42. Chronic mental illness often ebbs and wanes in terms of debilitating
systems. Here, the new paradigm will be called the "Intermittently Mentally
Il" patient (IMI), meaning a person with a controllable level of mental dys-
function who is able to live safely in the community. As modem psychiatric
medications have reduced the severity of psychosis to permit treatment in the
community, it has concomitantly created a new problem for the severely men-
tally ill patient. Without the supervision afforded in an institution, many pa-
tients have found it difficult to maintain a medication regimen. The conse-
quence is the IMI patient who can sustain existence in the community with
proper support as long as therapeutic medications control psychotic symptoms
and prevent serious mental destabilization. This concept has also been termed
"the revolving-door syndrome." See Gustavo A. Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard,
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ognizes the new and largely welcomed scientific advances that now
provide the clinical support necessary to patients with severe mental
illnesses and sustain them in their own community with the dignity of
controlling their treatment to a reasonable degree.
It is well known that many seriously mentally ill patients, however,
present a problem of periodically regressing to a dysfunctional level of
psychosis. This condition is not really chronic in the sense of being
randomly uncontrollable for long periods. Rather, with proper ad-
vanced planning to ensure proper medication or other help, the person
is only "intermittently mentally ill," in the sense of an ability to sus-
tain long periods of outpatient treatment and freedom. The intermit-
tently mentally ill person still faces the risk of occasional relapse due
to a failure to continue medication, a failure of that medication, or
other factors which destabilize an individual's mental state. But, if a
Nexum agreement exists, such relapses or deteriorating mental facul-
ties can often be planned for by the person himself, based on precur-
sive behaviors or recognizing behaviors that have already occurred in
the cycles of the mental illness.
Congress has made advance directives a national priority because
they serve both the public and the patient's interests. Even if the re-
lapses cannot be predicted with certainty, a plan can minimize pain,
suffering, and loss of autonomy. Most of these episodes of severe re-
lapse are due to a failure of psychotropic medication to control the
symptoms of the disease. This usually includes a significant impair-
ment of insight by the person into his own deterioration to either seek
or consent to treatment. Further risks can, and usually do, include a se-
rious inability to cope with the hazards faced in the community (such
as harsh seasonal conditions, predatory individuals, getting medical
Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on the Revolving-Door Syn-
drome in North Carolina, 41 HosP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1002
(1990). However, this term seems not only pejorative but also fatalistic, im-
plying that regular relapses among the mentally ill are inevitable and regular.
Indeed, it harkens back to the term "lunatic" which also implied regularity of
the mental illness as in the phases of the moon. In contrast, the IMI paradigm
implies that with proper assistance in preparing for such relapses, especially
with advance directives, they can be minimized in frequency and quickly ar-
rested from becoming worse. This will minimize patient and social costs and
maximize autonomy and available resources for treatment. Ironically, the IMI
concept is closer to the now archaic term "lunatic" that implied undifferenti-
ated mental illness that was related to (and caused by) the moon's influence.
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care, etc.), permanent or irretrievable deterioration of mental condi-
tion, posing risks to others and possible institutionalization if civil
commitment must be sought.
Characteristics of the intermittently mentally ill can be empirically
identified. This identification is fundamentally a function of the less-
ening of insight or awareness into their disease. In a downward spiral,
this leads to the deterioration in both mental and physical health due to
the cessation of psychotropic medications and a dire need for a more
structured treatment environment.43 Kraepellin first described the
phenomenon of lack of insight in noticing that: "The patients have, at
first at least, no real understanding of the gravity of the disorder...
[they] give as answers explanations that say nothing." 44 Older text-
books of psychiatry only slightly refer to this concept of insight other
than in psychoanalysis, the most influential modality of treatment at
the turn of Twentieth Century.45 Some studies show that even though
a patient could distinguish between psychotic symptoms, while in oth-
ers, insight into a patient's own condition remained impaired.46 This
suggests that delay or interrupted treatment produces less insight or
more insight deterioration in a subgroup of chronically impaired pa-
43. "The phenomenon of poor insight is defined as a general lack of
awareness of having a mental disorder or needing treatment, for example, psy-
chotropic medications. Contemporary definitions of insight regard this phe-
nomenon as occurring on a continuum which can be assessed by skilled clini-
cians. Thus, insight can be reliably measured using ratings on standardized in-
struments. Using standardized scales, researchers have found that ratings of
poor insight in schizophrenia are associated with lack of compliance in taking
medications, refusal of treatment regimens, poorer over-all recovery after
treatment, an increased risk of psychological decompensation, a greater num-
ber of rehospitalizations, poorer long-term outcome and worse over-all treat-
ment outcome." See Robert C. Schwartz, Symptomatology and Insight in
Schizophrenia, 82 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 227, 228 (1998); Shmuel Fennig, et
al., Insight in first-admission psychotic patients, 22 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 257,
261-62 (1996). See also Akihiro Takai, et al., Insight and its Related Factors
in Chronic Schizophrenic Patients: A Preliminary Study, 6 EUR. J.
PSYCHIATRY. 159, 167 (1992).
44. Xavier F. Amador and Regine Anna Seckinger, B.A., The Assessment
of Insight: A Methodological Review, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 798, 798
(1997).
45. See Anthony David & Roisin Kemp Franzc, Five Perspectives on the
Phenomenon of Insight in Psychosis, 27:12 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 791, 791
(1997).
46. See Michael Startup, supra note 32, at 203-11 (1997).
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tients 7 Conversely, amelioration of psychotic condition consistently
yielded improvement in insight, especially concerning previous illness
episodes.4 8 Studies estimate that between fifty-seven and eighty per-
cent of persons with serious mental illness can have moderate or se-
vere impairment in their insight. 49 Insight into having an illness, how-
ever, may be less important than an awareness of the previous efficacy
of pharmacotherapy because awareness of previous positive outcomes
can be more predictive of compliance, acceptance of diagnosis, and
awareness of the higher quality of life when the individual is healthy.50
These studies show that schizophrenia affects the cognitive function
of the brain that controls a person's self-awareness of the disease. Ad-
ditional studies conclude that there is brain dysfunction on a contin-
uum in terms of metabolism, cognition, neurology, and eye tracking in
persons with schizophrenia and that it is found in most affected indi-
viduals to one degree or another.' Moreover, the disease profoundly
affects personality. Based on scientific research made possible by new
technology that can track brain functions like never before, scientists
increasingly view schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorders as or-
ganic in origin, causing brain pathology.
52
47. See April A. Collins et al., Insight, Neurocognitive Function and
Symptom Clusters in Chronic Schizophrenia, 27 SCHIZOPHRENIA 37, 42
(1997).
48. Roisin A. Kemp & Timothy J.R. Lambert, Insight in Schizophrenia
and its Relationship to Psychopathology, 18 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 21, 27
(1995).
49. See Xavier F. Amador, et al., Awareness of Illness: Schizophrenia and
Schizoaffective Mood Disorders, 51 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 826, 836
(1994); Robert C. Schwartz, The Relationship Between Insight, Illness and
Treatment Outcome in Schizophrenia, 69 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 1 (1998) (citing two
studies: 90% poor insight; 67% moderate to severe lack of insight).
50. See Amador and Seckinger, supra note 44, at 804.
51. See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MANIC
DEPRESSIVE DISORDER 143-49 (1994).
52. See, e.g., Thomas J. Raedler et al., Schizophrenia as a Developmental
Disorder of the Cerebral Cortex, 8 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 157
(1998); Michael B. Knable & Daniel R. Weinberger, Dopamine, the Prefronl I
Cortex and Schizophrenia, 11 J. OF PSYCHOPHARMOCOLOGY 123, 124 (1997);
Michael B. Knable & Daniel Weinberger, Are Mental Diseases Brain Di*-
eases? The Contribution of Neuropathology to Understanding of SchizO-
phrenic Psychoses, 245 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL




These negatively reinforcing conditions and symptoms make treat-
ment and gaining consent very difficult. The majority of patients who
lack insight, awareness or consciousness of their disease, are indiffer-
ent to it and reject the need for treatment. This is logical to such per-
sons - if you sincerely think you are not ill, why would you seek or
submit to treatment? Thus, the patient will deny having any disease,
rei'use to acknowledge any symptom, and feel it is appropriate to ref-
use treatment. Indeed, this usually manifests itself as belligerency to-
wards both the treatment and the individual supplying the treatment.
53
This belligerency manifests itself in the dilemma that persons who do
not know of their illness cannot adequately make the decision to ref-
use treatment, thereby affecting any possibility of restoring their deci-
sion making ability.54 Conversely, there is a strong correlation be-
tween a person's self-awareness and insight into the illness of schizo-
phrenia and seeking and consenting to appropriate ameliorative treat-
ment:
Common sense suggests, and research studies confirm,
that the mentally ill with greater insight into their con-
dition are more likely to seek psychiatric help when
they become sick and also to comply with treatment
regimens. . . . Another study found that persons with
53. See Amador, supra note 49, at 826 (1994); Xavier F. Amador &
David H. Strauss, Poor Insight in Schizophrenia, 64 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 305, 305
(1993); Xavier F. Amador et al., Assessment of Insight in Psychosis, 150 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 873, 873 (1993); Xavier F. Amador et al., Awareness oflilness
in Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPAHRENIA BULL. 113, 113 (1991); TORREY, supra
note 2, at 198.
54. "Most medical professionals do not question the competence of a
patient who is consenting to treatment. This may be due to the clinician's un-
willingness to question a patient's autonomy when the physician reasonably
believes the patient is agreeing to a procedure that is in his or her best inter-
ests. On the other hand, it has been argued that rejection of treatment may
function as a useful indicator of the need for a competence assessment. That is
to say, only patients who are making choices that, in the judgment of the cli-
nicians, threaten their medial welfare should be subjected to rigorous exami-
nation of their capacity to make decisions." Jessica Wilen Berg, et al., Con-
structing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make
Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 345, 393 (1996). "All patients who
refuse treatment are not per se incompetent nor should formal screening
mechanisms be applied to all consenting patients, but rejection can be used as
a means of identifying those patients whose competence should be examined
further." Id.
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schizophrenia who had impaired insight were less
likely to comply with the demands of a work rehabili-
tation program.... Impaired insight is the single most
important reason why the mentally ill do not take medi-
cations re§ularly and is thus the most important cause
of relapse. 5
There is evidence that the ability of patients to exercise a right to in-
formed consent after they become acutely psychotic, particularly in
cases of schizophrenia, is generally open to serious doubt, especially
when they are taking or offered anti-psychotic medication.56 One study
recommended that "[t]he patient's verbal assent to treatment, supple-
mented with a proxy consent obtained from friends, relatives, or
committees, may be a more rational alternative to present consent pro-
cedures that emphasize form over content. 57 These issues should
clearly be decided, for both patient and the physician in the context of
a Nexum agreement. Which would enhance the coordination of treat-
ment as well as reduce duplication, and produce a workable treatment
plan. Thus, the Nexum produces, a new form of mental health advance
directive proposed, allows the physician to act as the mediator, if nec-
essary, and to include whomever will help in this effort.
58
The Nexum will personally involve the physician and become a
show of commitment to the patient. The effectiveness of mental health
treatment is proportional to the amount of genuine patient cooperation
and acceptance of physician advice. 59 When physicians participate,
55. TORREY, supra note 2, at 155.
56. "This study indicates that psychotic patients, particularly those with
prominent thought disturbance, do not substantially understand information
about antipsychotic medication. Meaningful informed consent in which the
psychiatric patient learns about his or her illness, its treatment, and possible
risks (for example tardive dyskinesia), may need to be delayed for the acutely
disturbed hospitalized patient until disorganization of thought can be treated
with antipsychotic medication." Michael Irwin et al., Psychotic Patients Un-
derstanding of Informed Consent, 142 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 1351, 1354
(1985).
57. Id.
58. Patricia A. Fennell, CFS [Chronic Fatigue Syndrome] Sociocultural
Influences and Trauma: Clinical Considerations, 1 J. OF CHRONIC FATIGUE
SYNDROME 159, 170 (1995).
59. See Bruce Winick, Symposium on Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Ex-
amination of Coercion, Exploitation, and the Law: III. Coerced Confinement
and Treatment: Coercion and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
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and give patients explanations and choices in the process, adherence
by patients increases.60 Self-guardianship over one's periods of in-
competence would promise the patient intrinsic control and motivate
the patient to participate. It would largely obviate objections to treat-
ment and transfer any residual objection at the time of rendering
treatment to an administrative panel consisting of a member with di-
rect knowledge and experience of mental illness, unlike most members
of the judiciary
III. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE MODERN LEGAL
CONTEXT
"Deinstitutionalization" represents one of the most profound social
movements in late twentieth century American history. Based on new
developments in medical treatment, it ends a period of at least two
centuries of English and American treatment of the mentally ill based
on the idea that persons with severe mental illness should be cared for
in an asylum. In 450 B.C., Hippocrates, a Greek physician, became
one of the first to believe that mental illness was a disease in the sense
of being caused by natural phenomena. He proposed the asylum as a
retreat to remove the stress and impurities of life that were thought to
exacerbate mental disorders.
61
Modem terminology has often changed names for the asylum, from
"institutions" to "facilities for the mentally ill," probably as a way to
mask the constant problems and abuses occurring in them. Yet, for all
their failings, the asylums provided state of the art treatment and pro-
tection to patients with severe mental illness who would otherwise suf-
fer the hazards of living in society and the hostilities of the general
public toward persons with mental disabilities.62
In' the 1950's pharmocology produced its most dramatic results:
symptom-suppressing, neuroleptic drugs. For the first time, these new
drugs permitted patients to adequately function outside the close su-
pervision of the institution. Along with this change came the increas-
1145, 1161 (1997).
60. DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 68-74 (1991).
61. See Brakel, supra note 13, at 9.
62. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 72-76 (1982).
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ingly high cost of operating institutions and changes in civil rights
laws and policy, which in turn spurred changes in government policies
.and funding. The result was a massive shift in the venue for care and
treatment, resulting in almost 500,000 people being released from the
care and security of the institution to greater responsibility and free-
dom in the community. 
63
The magnitude of deinstitutionalization of the severely
mentally ill qualifies it as one of the largest social ex-
periments in American history. In 1955, there were
558,239 severely mentally ill patients in the nation's
public psychiatric hospitals. In 1994, this number had
been reduced by 486,620 patients, to 71,619 .... It is
important to note, however, that the census number of
558,239 patients in public psychiatric hospitals in 1955
was in relationship to the nation's total population at
the time, which was 164 million. By 1994, the nation's
population had increased to 260 million. If there had
been the same proportion of patients per population in
public mental hospitals in 1994 as there had been in
1955, the patients would have totaled 885,010. The true
magnitude of deinstitutionalization, then, is the differ-
ence between 885,010 and 71,619. In effect, approxi-
mately 92 percent of the people who would have been
living in public psychiatric hospitals in 1955 were not
living there in 1994.64
.Despite these social changes, the federal government's enthusiasm
for rapid change, especially during the administration of John F. Ken-
nedy, was not matched by workable practices and available funding.
65
Deinstitutionalization began initially with initiatives of the executive
branch of the federal government, with state governments following
shortly thereafter. Two decades later, the judiciary began to play an
important role in shaping the course of treatment by reqiuring legal
procedures and conditions for rendering care and treatment. Many of
these reqiuements were the result of horrible scandals that pockmarked
63. TORREY, supra note 2, at 8-9; Allan D. Miller, Deinstitutionalization
in Retrospect, 57 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 160, 169 (1985).
64. Id.
65. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 61 AMERICAN
SCHOLAR 17 (1993); see also The Care of the Mentally Ill in the State of New
York, A Report by a Commission appointed by Honorable Thomas E. Dewey
Governor of the State of New York (1944).
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the landscape of institutional care continually. 66
A large, well-organized cohort of public interest lawyers carried on
this litigation.67 Based in part on reaction to scandals and a growth in
so-called "public interest law," the lawyers worked vigorously to ac-
celerate the demise of the state-based institutional care system. In the
early 1970's, many of these lawyers began litigation aimed at de-
stroying government reliance on both the institutional care system and
the paternalism inherent in its pervasive control of patient's lives.
Lawsuits were brought with the aim of minimizing or eliminating in-
stitutionalization of the mentally ill by successfully suing to obtain ju-
dically mandated procedures similar to those in criminal law. The
hope was that intensive crypto-criminal due process requirements
would make it so difficult and expensive for government to involun-
tarily commit patients for care and treatment that efforts to do so
would be slowed down or largely abandoned.68 Yet, this litigation was
counter-productive from the patients perspective because it destroyed
whatever sanctuary the asylum provided. Unfortunately, the results
have clearly been that persons discharged into the community with
impaired decision-making lacked the skills to cope with the hazards of
freedom thrust upon them. Sadly, the alternative to the asylum has in-
creasingly become the prison.69 These results made it more difficult
66. One well documented example is the closing of the Willowbrook De-
velopmental Center in Staten Island, NY. See DAVID COHEN & SHELA COHEN,
THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 262-295 (1984).
67. See RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE
STREETS, 109-160 (1990); see also Rael Jean Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Sub-
verting Good Intentions: A Brief History of Mental Health "Reform," 2
CORNELL J. L & PUB. POL'Y. 89, 116-17 n. 93 (1992); Paul Chodoff, Invol-
untary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 AMER. J. OF
PSYCHIATRY. 384, 384 (1984).
68. See BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS,
PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW 216-17 (1972).
69. See C.G. Schoenfeld, Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the
Mentally Ill: "A Corner-Stone of Legal Structure Lain in Mud", 9 UNIv. TOL.
L. REV. 1, 29 (1977). "In fact, well intentioned judges, lawyers, and legisla-
tors may well have paved a hellish road indeed for the mentally ill .... The
upgrading of standards of institutional care ... coupled with the granting to
mental patients the full panoply of procedural rights given to many criminal
defendants . . . has resulted in many of the mentally ill actually becoming
criminal defendants, or being abandoned in the inner city." Id.; see also De-
partment of Justice, supra note 2.
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and expensive to treat the most severely ill patients, particularly when
legal adversaries who represented these patients became a fixture of
the legal landscape. 70 In many states, courts assumed gratuitously su-
pervisory jurisdiction over mental institutions rendering coupled
judgments that would last for decades and would inevitably compli-
cate, delay, and distort government programs designed to re-orient
treatment systems.7 1 The lawyers focused on the rights to informed
consent and freedom from exploitation. This included the right to be
paid for institutional labor, which effectively eliminated patients'
ability to learn useful skills, such as growing fresh vegetables in facil-
ity gardens or other farming tasks. Most of all, these lawyers sought to
make patients free, not only from experimental or potentially danger-
ous treatments, they also wanted the courts to recognize a general
right to refuse treatment with psychotropic medication. These asser-
tions of rights supplemented the claim for a right to an alternative to
institutionalization. 2
On the national level, the United States Supreme Court began tak-
ing cases involving what is historically termed "involuntary treat-
ment. '73 In O'Connor v. Donaldson,74 the Supreme Court made its
70. See Allan Miller, Deinstitutionalization in Retrospect, 57 PSYCHIATRIC
Q. 160, 169 (1985).
71. Of the two most famous cases in which a court exercised federal su-
pervisory jurisdiction over institutions, one lasted over two decades, NYS As-
sociation for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), while the other was filed in 1970 and is still pending today. Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
72. See ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO
THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AND MENTAL RETARDATION 3
(1996).
73. While it is beyond the purview of this article, the point must be made
that the term "involuntary" is a misnomer for a person who is incompetent to
make a decision. It can be argued that it makes little sense to call a patient's
objection to treatment "involuntary" after a court finds the patient is incompe-
tent to make such a decision. Thus, there is legally speaking no volitional
component in a person who cannot exercise "free will," and treatment is not
"involuntary" as such. As Aristotle wrote, a person who is not able to make
rational decisions cannot act other than randomly. See Nicomachean Ethics,
supra note 21, at 8. Thus, such treatment might be termed "assisted," "avol-
untary," or "judicially ordered," but it is not "involuntary" for a person who is
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first major pronouncement of substantive due process in the mental
health field. It was a very ambiguous, yet profound ruling. The Court's
holding appeared, and was understood by most legal experts, to un-
dermine a state's traditional parens patriae power over civil commit-
ment patients by requiring all civil commitment cases to require proof
of the patient's dangerousness." The necessity to prove a patient is
dangerous is of course the antithesis of the parental model of caretak-
ing, i.e., parents do not render care only when their children are in
danger. This was one of the first nails in the coffin of the "medical
model," where the decision to treat a mentally ill person could be
based on three classic elements: (1) the patient having a mental illness;
(2) his lack of insight; and (3) the suitability of treatment or the need
for custodial care. Despite this holding, courts were reluctant to com-
pletely eliminate short-term commitments based solely on the medical
76judgment of physicians.
Although O'Connor appears to establish a requirement for a find-
ing of "dangerousness" in all compulsory treatment cases, it is equally
likely that this pronouncement is merely dicta since dangerousness
never became an issue in the case of the plaintiff's initial commitment,
nor was there any evidence that the patient himself was dangerous or
faced danger during the fifteen years of hospitilization. The result of
this decision was ambiguity with unanticipated negative consequences
for treatment of the mentally ill. Now, instead of dangerousness being
defined as facing a potential hazard not of the patient's own creation,
the O'Connor Court believed that dangerous can mean an inability to
avoid dangers such as living in conditions of squalor, neglect, or fail-
ing to care for oneself.77 A young child is not considered "dangerous"
legally incompetent.
74. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
75. See In re Scopes, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205 (3rd Dept. 1977); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (West
Group, vol. 2, 1992); Paul S. Appelbaum, Legal Aspects of Clinical Care for
Severely Mentally Ill, Homeless Persons, 20 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 455, 456-57 (1992).
76. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir. 1983).
77. See Paul F. Stavis, Involuntary Hospitalization in the Modern Era: Is
"Dangerousness" Ambiguous or Obsolete? 41 QUALITY CARE 2, 3 (Aug.-
Sept. 1989); see also Brakel, supra note 13, at 35 ("[T]he dangerousness lan-
guage used by the Court was stated in the negative and primarily in response
to the claim of a right to treatment.").
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when he tries to cross a busy street simply because he does not know
how to do so safely. Rather, he is said to be "in danger," "endan-
gered," or "unable to avoid danger." Yet this is the ambiguity in cases
where civil commitment is clearly unwarranted, causing courts to
mischaracterize and stigmatize otherwise innocent behavior as "dan-
gerous. 'T While part of the intent was to place the burden of errone-
ous determinations on the state treatment initiative, in such instances
this might be a Hobbesian choice because the patient undoubtedly car-
ries a substantial burden and risk of not receiving needed treatment.
80
The use of the dangerous criteria for compulsory treatment of the seri-
ously mentally ill creates problems of loss of autonomy for the patient,
as well as higher costs and lower efficiency of the mental health sys-
tem. Perhaps, it might not be used at all.8 ' It is an essential and tradi-
tional function of government to prevent harm and violence caused by
or clearly connected to a mental illness, and every state and most na-
tions have laws to control it. Yet, it should not be a preferred crite-
rion, only a necessary one.
If the O'Connor decision requires some element of "danger to one-
self or others" in any compulsory treatment situation, then it injects
uncertainty and less than reliable proof into the treatment process. To
prove dangerousness is a dilemma, because either the person must
have prior dangerous behavior, or if he or she has not, then proof nec-
essarily becomes a prediction. It is senseless to talk about future be-
havior without actuarial data since all that can be somewhat reasona-
bly predicted are the behaviors that might be the precursors of danger-
78. See Harold J. Bursztajn, et al., Beyond the Black Letter of the Law: An
Empirical Study of an Individual Judge's Decision Process for Civil Commit-
ment Hearings, 25 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 79, 89-90 (1997); see
generally Harold J. Bursztajn, et al., Process Analysis of Judges Commitment
Decisions: A Preliminary Empirical Study, 140 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 4
(1994); J.C. Phelan and B.G. Link, The Growing Belief that People with Men-
tal Illnesses are Violent: The Role of the Dangerous Criteria for Civil Com-
mitment, 33 PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY $7-S12 (1998).
79. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
80. See Susan Lee, Heller v. Doe: Involuntary Civil Commitment and the
"Objective" Language of Probability, 20 AMER. J. L. & MED. 457, 476
(1994).
81. See, e.g., Alan Stone, Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil




ous acts. 2 To the extent that predicting dangerousness can be done
with any precision, there is a high false positive rate with regard to
any individual. Clearly, predicting future behavior that very likely will
be dangerous is not a clinical activity, nor is it therapeutic in enhanc-
ing a beneficial alliance between the patient and doctor.
83
Further unintended consequences flowed from O'Connor. There are
serious dilemmas for the patient: being falsely stigmatized as a dan-
gerous person and failing to otherwise legally qualify for the parens
patriae benefits of government sponsored treatment, or the fear of
being left to deteriorate until reaching the point of real danger so the
state can act. Proper parens patriae intervention obviously means that
treatment should be rendered before a person deteriorates to the point
of threatening his own life, health or ability to resume a healthy life-
style.8 4 Subsidiary issues of how intense, how immediate, or how dire
the danger must be to qualify were not addressed by the Court. Years
later, the Court held that the level of proof for civil commitment and
the element of proof concerning "dangerousness" must be by "clear
and convincing" evidence.8 5 Given that psychiatrists are not particu-
larly proficient in predicting dangerousness, there is an increased im-
probability that care could be rendered parens patriae to persons with
serious mental illness. 6
The Court, having unintentionally undermined the traditional law
of civil commitment, subsequently went on to cast doubts on more
modern statutory developments that required treatment in the "least
restrictive" or most voluntary setting. The case, Zinermon v. Burch, 87
involved an injured and clearly delusional man, Darrell Burch, who
82. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 97, 104 n.28 (1984).
83. See Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill as a
Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 386 (1984).
84. See Stephen Rachlin, Civil Commitment, Parens Patriae and the Right
to Refuse Treatment, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 0 174, 177 (1979).
85. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.
86. See Allen Kirk, The Prediction of Violent Behavior During Short-Term
Civil Commitment, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 345, 350-55
(1989), but see John Junginger, Hallucinations and The Prediction of
Dangerousness, 46 Psychiatric Services 911, 914 (1995); see also Robert A.
Zeiss, Dangerousness Commitments: Indices of Future Violence Potential?, 24
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 247, 251-52 (1996).
87. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, § 31.23.
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was found wandering on a Florida highway.88 The Court found con-
stitutional infirmity in the psychiatric hospital's failure to question and
ultimately to refuse Burch's voluntary request for admission. This
failure denied the patient the due process attendant to an involuntary
judicial commitment proceeding.89 Under these circumstances, the
Court apparently failed to consider that the delay in the patient's ame-
lioration that such a proceeding would cause, as well as the expense to
the state and the diversion of mental health resources from other pa-
tients to question the presumption of competence, particularly where
the patient is clearly in need of treatment.
.This decision causes considerable consternation in the mental health
system for a variety of reasons. Chief among these are whether the
mental health system will require universal administrative proceedings
for voluntary patients, whether facility personnel have a constitutional
peril added to other disincentives to treatment of seriously mentally ill
persons, and what effect this has on state laws requiring voluntary ad-
mission where it is appropriate. 90 For advocates of persons in need of
psychiatric treatment, the disincentives this decision creates in ac-
cepting patients who need treatment are considerable.
In contrast, the Court has refused to increase the level of difficulty
in obtaining treatment in cases of the commitment of children of minor
age,9' and has not intervened in the question of whether a state could
use different standards of proof for different disabilities.92 Yet the
Court persists in its suspicion of psychiatry due to a "wide divergence
of opinion and diagnoses 9 3 and its premise that these decisions are
inherently a "massive curtailment of liberty."94 This language has been
used repeatedly by courts in the context of judicially ordered institu-
tionalization. The question should be asked whether, in the modern era
88. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1975).
89. Id.
90. See Rael Jean Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Subverting Good Intentions:
A Brief History of Mental Health Law "Reform," 2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 89, 96 (1992); Paul Appelbaum, Voluntary Hospitalization and Due
Process: The Dilemma ofZinermon v. Burch, 41 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY
1059 (1990).
91. See Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979).
92. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 328 (1993).
93. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).




of limited psychiatric resources for the severely mentally ill, is this
concept still accurate or credible?
Today, there are very few incentives to prolong expensive treat-
ment, as evidenced by the contemporary issues of limiting government
spending by using a managed care system. Length of hospital stays
and reduction in the use of civil commitment all attest to a low likeli-
hood of excessive treatment. 95 Also, given the strong propensity of the
state to treat patients in the community and to use standard approved
psychiatric medications, can it really be said that this is a massive dep-
rivation of freedom? All of these new programs are clearly aimed at
avoiding institutionalization and promoting a greater freedom through
treatment.96 Finally, what could be the measure of damages for a pa-
tient who was undoubtedly better off being served sooner, perhaps
even while living, by virtue of professionally appropriate intervention
as in the case of Zinermon v. Burch.
The patient has a strong interest in avoiding a delay in treatment.
This is not necessarily the interest of the court or the patient advocate,
who see their role as zealously resisting the proposal for treatment.97
As with most serious illness, delay can make recovery or amelioration
disproportionately more difficult and in some cases impossible.98 The
understanding or rationality element of competence would fundamen-
tally require that a patient be objectively aware of the mental illness.
Because denial of existing psychopathology strongly suggests incom-
95. See Richard C. Surles, Free Choice, Informed Choice, and Dangerous
Choices in Choice and Responsibility: Legal and Ethical Dilemnas in Services
for Persons With Mental Disabilities 17-18 (Clarence Sundstrom ed. 1994).
96. Indeed, tort damages have been awarded for the liberty denied by a
failure to treat a patient in a timely way. See Whitetree v. State of New York,
290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1968).
97. See Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful
Choices-What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency
Construct, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1102, 1136-62 (1994); Melvin R. Shaw,
Professional Responsibility of Attorneys Representing Institutionalized Mental
Patients in Relation to Psychotropic Medication, 22 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L.
186, 190 (1989); Committee on Professional Responsibility, A Delicate Bal-
ance: Ethical Rules for Those Who Represent Incompetent Clients, 52 THE
RECORD 35 (1987); Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and
Theories of Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 121, 128-132 (1999).
98. John M. Davis and Suzanne Anriukaitis, The Natural Course of
Schizophrenia and Effective Maintenance Drug Treatment, 6 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 28,48 (1986).
1999]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
petence, a patient who rejects a physician's diagnosis that to a reason-
able medical certainty a mental illness exists and needs to be treated,
would fundamentally fail to satisfy this criterion. 99 For example, a pa-
tient who actually realizes a terminal illness, but refuses to have it
treated does not necessarily mean he is incompetent. 00 A competent
person would at least need to realize that he was entering a hospital for
treatment and that release might not be immediately available upon his
request.' 01 This can be called a rational relationship test. A patient, in
order to be able to make a decision, must be able to recognize basic
facts that are relevant to the reality of his or her situation and be able
to make a decision in his or her personal best interest. Beyond the pa-
tient's realization of the relevancy of facts, there is the further issue of
his or her ability to assess them. As an example, a patient may not be
able to understand that modem psychotropic medications have rela-
tively few side effects and instances of permanent negative health con-
sequences, especially when these are balanced against the patient's
need for them to function or remain away from dangers.1
0 2
These deficits in decision-making correlate to certain types of men-
tal illness. For example, patients hospitalized with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia or depression more often show deficits in their decision
making than hospitalized medically ill patients or non-patients.
Schizophrenic patients tend to be more impaired than depressed pa-
tients and patients with more severe schizophrenia, especially those
with thought disturbances, who have more manifest deficits in under-
standing and reasoning. 0 3 There is empirical evidence that a patient's
ability to understand and rationally appreciate facts of the diagnosed
illness indicates decision-making competency, especially of patients
with schizophrenia. °4 Patients unaware that they are sick cannot ade-
99. See Berg, supra note 54, at 355, 366.
100. See In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528 (1988).
101. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 379, 380 and n.99 (discussing the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association Task Force on Consent to Voluntary Hospitaliza-
tion).
102. William M. Glazer and John M. Kane, Depot Neuroleptic Therapy:
An Underutilized Treatment Option, 53 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 426, 431-32
(1992).
103. J.W. Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of
Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 372-
74, n.94 (1996).
104. Id. at 381, 382, n. 106.
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quately weigh the risk or benefits of potential treatments. 0 5 There is
also the natural concurrence of the physician and patient in treatment
situations, i.e., where a patient accepts sound medical judgments made
under the standards of the profession as indicative of the appropriate-
ness of treatment and sound judgment of the patient. 0 6 Whereas rejec-
tion of clearly necessary treatment, e.g., in the case of a life-
threatening condition and a patient's suicidal tendency, might call for
an assessment of competency. This is, of course, not to say that dis-
agreement with clinicians is evidence of incompetence. Rather, in ap-
propriate and substantial deviations from normal patient behavior, it
would naturally raise a need to consider whether further investigation
is warranted. 07
The law's recognition of the importance of personal autonomy in
competency determinations is evident in requiring "clear and con-
vincing" evidence before autonomy is reduced or negated. 0 8 Judicial
decisions have formulated the legal criteria for involuntary treatment
without much apparent concern for the deliterious effects they have
had on rendering treatment, for costs of litigation and treatment, or for
delay in patient amelioration. It is one thing to utilize a high burden of
proof when taking autonomy from a patient. It becomes a questionable
calculus both for the state and the patient to use the same high stan-
dard for giving the patient necessary and expensive psychiatric treat-
ment, which is deemed necessary by a court or by a physician, is
within acceptable medical standards, and whose ultimate purpose is to
restore autonomy.
The risk of a given drug approved by the United States Food and
Drug Administration are certainly less than the risks of remaining un-
treated and not being restored to health, autonomy, and to a quality
life. Additionally, untreated severe mental illness increases the
105. See Steven K. Hoge et al., A Prospective, Multicenter Study of Pa-
tient's Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
949 (1990)
106. Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that a minor-aged child does
not have a right to an independent judicial commitment hearing where parents
consent for his treatment, as long as physician concurrence is consistent with
professional standards).
107. See Francis Cornos et al., Report of the Task Force on Consent to
Voluntary Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY. & L. 293, 301
(1993).
108. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.
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chances of suicide and death from other causes, above that of for ei-
ther non-mentally ill persons or for persons treated for mental illness;
one by suicide, the other by homicide.'
0 9
In consequentialist terms, the issue is whether the harm of incor-
rectly labeling autonomous agents as incompetent is outweighed by
the harm of incorrectly ignoring the patient's autonomy, or right of
self-determination. The latter is significant to the extent the patient's
well-being is at risk; no harm results from allowing an incompetent
patient to make a decision of minimal effect or one that is in keeping
with his or her objective best interests. Accordingly, only competent
patients should be free to make decisions that are not in their best in-
terests while others could be erroneously permitted to do so at their
peril."
The confusion in attempting to expand due process standards
reached an surrealistic heights when the highest court in New York
State stretched the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard indis-
criminately beyond the issue of patient competency and reviewed the
actual clinical standards of treatment. In Rivers v. Katz, I the Court of
Appeals held that:
The State would bear the burden of demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence the patient's incapacity
to make a treatment decision . . . [I]f, however, the
court concludes that the patient lacks the capacity to
determine the course of his own treatment, the court
must determine whether the proposed treatment is nar-
rowly tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's
liberty interest ... [t]he State would bear the burden to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
proposed treatment meets these criteria.'' 2
Here, the court redundantly adjudicates the need of treatment by
standard psychotropic medication for a patient who already was adju-
dicated incompetent and found to be in need of psychiatric treatment.
Many other state courts have similarly injected the judicial process
109. TORREY, supra note 2, at 8-9 (1997).
110. Berg et al., supra note 54, at 377.
111. 67 N.Y. 2d 485 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).
112. Id. at 497-98. In footnote 7, the court impliedly suggests that lower
courts make findings of facts involving clinical psychiatric diagnosis and ap-




into the psychiatric treatment system." 3 Rivers, and much of the judi-
cial intervention, suggests a redundancy to the state's involuntary
treatment process. The delays and expense should be of much concern
to a mentally ill patient as well as to government and society. They
should also be of concern to advocates of effective treatment.
114
Rivers typifies how courts have promoted neither state or patient
interest to improve the availability or the quality of mental health
treatment. Rivers demonstrates an appalling misunderstanding of psy-
chiatry. The Court said at the very least that the patient's competence
or incompetence to make the treatment decision is "uniquely a judi-
cial, not a medical function. 15 In fact, patients, if treated early in their
mental disease, can return home in a few weeks. "Paradoxically, if the
patient's right to refuse medication is protected exclusively by judicial
process, the patients will never make the decision themselves, the le-
113. See Alexander Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medica-
tions: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (1987); see also Rogers v.
Commissioner of the Dep't. of Mental Health, 458 N.E. 2d 308 (Mass. 1983);
State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 400 N.W. 2d 1 (1986), aff'd 416 N.W. 2d
883 (Wis. 1987).
114. "While judicial mechanisms provide a significant degree of protection
for individual rights, they also entail a number of disadvantages, including
high cost and substantial delay." Berg, supra note 54, at 393.
115. See Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d at 496. This might be the major flaw in
the Rivers decision, but not the only one. The court cited only one law review
article, Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Ogre: Mental Patients Right to Ref-
use Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1978), which is one of the worst ex-
amples of many found in legal literature that inaccurately and pejoratively un-
dercut the successes of standard psychiatric medications. Courts often get the
nature and facts of psychiatric care wrong. Good advocacy of inaccurate facts
too often prevails in the courtroom. See Sara L. Kellerman & Harvard Hollen-
berg, Expanded Commitment Standard for Psychiatric Hospitalization,
N.Y.L.J. 1 (Jan. 2, 1987); see also Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Tak-
ing Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental Patients and the Right to Refuse
Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429, 436-41 nn. 27, 30 (1991). It is inexplicable,
except as genuine role confusion, that both the courts and lawyers, while sup-
posedly focusing on the issue of the patient's competency, get into the realm
of medical/clinical judgment on the appropriateness and suitability of the pre-
scribed treatment. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment
with Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospects, 145 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 413, 416 (1988); POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, FINAL REPORT:
RESEARCH STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT
COMMITMENT PILOT PROGRAM, 18-23 (Dec. 4, 1998).
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gal process will make the decision for them." 6 Thus, the practical ef-
fect of Rivers hearings has been not only without much benefit to
anyone, but worse, diminished necessary treatment for most in need.
Courts ratify the physicians' decision in more than ninety percent of
cases, meanwhile the patient languishes in theoretical "liberty" within
the four walls of an institution. Previously, the resolution of patient
objections by administrative adjudication took ten to twenty-one days.
After the Rivers ruling on whether it is legal to treat over that objec-
tion, it took thirty-one to sixty-eight days. This causes an enormous
expense in hospital staff salaries, legal resources (which are not as
available to private, state-licensed clinics), and a deprivation of patient
liberty, in addition to prolonged hospital stays.
117
The root of the matter is that judicial decisions concerning compe-
tence are expensive and slow. Such a process for mental health is not
well suited for judicial review." 8 While competence might be an en-
116. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 450. Competence determina-
tions, known as clinical competency, are made by the thousands every day by
physicians and hospitals. And, indeed, even in a court of law, it is not the
court which decides competency, but rather selects from among expert wit-
nesses' determinations.
117. See J. Richard Ciccone et al., Medication Refusal and Judicial Activ-
ism: A Reexamination of the Effects of the Rivers Decision, 44 HOSp. &
COMM. PSYCHIATRY 555, 560 (1993). "Excluding the court costs, the price of
the patient's refusals in extra institutional care and legal fees was $13,000 for
the first and $19,000 for the second patient. None of this, of course, takes into
account the 'hidden' costs of managing a deteriorating patient and the atten-
dant effects on the safety and quality of care within the institution generally."
Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 460.
118. See Williams et al., Drug Treatment Refusal and Length of Hospitali-
zation of Insanity Acquittees, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 279
(1988) (treatment over objection sustained in 97% of cases initially and 100%
after a second opinion); Hargraves et al., Effects of the Jamison-Farabee Con-
sent Decree: Due Process Protection for Involuntary Psychiatric Patients
Treated with Psychoactive Drugs, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 188, 188 (1987)
(98% judicial approval); "In total, there have been approximately twelve
studies of 5,000 cases of patient's refusals of treatment. Courts have sustained
the refusals in only three percent of the cases, at an average time cost of forty-
eight days. Clinical review has affirmed the patient's rejection of the treat-
ment in four percent of the cases and comes at a cost of three to fifteen days in
treatment time lost ..... even in those rare cases when the formal judicial or
clinical decision upholds the patient's right to refuse, clinical deterioration of-
ten results." Id. See also Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 456 (1991).
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gendered legal issue in some cases, treatment decisions rarely do.
Courts, however, routinely get involved with treatment decisions by
virtue of competency issues. These decisions have consequences in
terms of suffering, delayed recovery, restoration of health and sub-
stantial economic costs to everyone involved. There also exists a seri-
ous question of the practical effect judicial review has on clinical rec-
ommendations to administer anti-psychotic medications. The usual re-
sult is ratification of the clinical decision to treat over a patient's ob-
jection, often times without the patient ever seeing a judge. One result
of such a hearing is the tendency to delay relief of the patient's suf-
fering while decreasing the quality of care that to the patient. In addi-
tion, these hearings tax the limited resources of the mental health sys-
tem by requiring attendance by psychiatrists and other professionals,
such as facility staff and state attorneys. 119 In fact, patients that with-
drew their application for court review before any proceedings began
actually had shorter hospitalizations. 20 Although, court review of
medication decisions, such as required by the Rivers decision, are in-
tended to reduce medication errors and support the patient's right to
autonomy through informed consent. The results are largely illusory,
if not contradictory.' 2 1 There is evidence that such court reviews tend
to cause greater care at the clinical level, but "[i]f this remains the sole
justification for a [court's] review procedure, []perhaps a more eco-
nomical approach should be devised.' 22
Mental health litigation is not particularly welcome by many judges
due to its complexities and uncertainties.' 23 Furthermore, there is evi-
l 19. See J. Richard Ciccone et al., supra note 117, at 556.
120. See Julie Magno Zito, et al., One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in
a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 295
(1989).
121. See Moynihan, supra note 65, at 560.
122. Hargraves, et al., supra note 118, at 190.
123.
Judicial decisions have become increasingly bizarre as judges
make diagnoses, order and reject treatments, and discharge pa-
tients. The courts often manifest gross ignorance of the issue
about which they create laws, relying on lawyers and doctors who
pose as experts but are actually persuaders, advocates, and propa-
gandists with economic or other agendas. In addition, the jury
system is not conducive to an accurate evaluation of care.'
I.N. Perr, Commentary in Forensic Psychiatry in THE PSYCHIATRIC TIMES-
MEDICINE & BEHAVIOR 31 (Nov. 1990); see also H. Owens, R. Rosner and
R.B. Harmon, The Judge's View of Competency Evaluations, 13 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSY. & L. 389 (1985).
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dence that judicial misunderstanding of psychiatry ultimately denies
the state authority to act parens patriae, while concomitantly denying
a person with mental illness expeditious amelioration of their condi-
tion.124 The dissenting opinion in Washington v. Harper25 evinces a
particularly strong suspicion of American psychiatry. This dissent
strongly implies that in American psychiatry there is the same poten-
tial for blatant abuse of civil rights as seen in the former Soviet Union.
Such an attitude reflects a prevalent judicial overestimation of the
dangers of drug therapy, despite some legitimate concerns about the
carelessness and mistakes that often occur for a variety of reasons in
institutional settings.126 It is not necessary in this controversy to em-
brace either extreme, where the system is totally supervised by the ju-
diciary or where there is no need for independent judicial review.
Perhaps adding even more confusion is the fact that lawyers re-
tained to represent patients have generally taken the attitude that even
in cases where their client is incompetent, they must resist the offer of
treatment. 127 In many instances, this attitude unecessarily increases
expense and delay or denial of treatment based on a rote legal postur-
ing that is more suited for criminal defense than for medical interven-
tion.
21
124. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 343.
125. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Justices Stev-
ens, Brennan and Marshall dissenting). Other judicial opinion have expressed
similar views that, although psychiatric medications were not used for "pun-
ishing thought," they were used as a means to "controlling thoughts... or by
coercing acceptance of particular thoughts and beliefs." Davis v. Hubbard,
506 F. Supp. 915, 926-33 (1980). Of course, it is absolutely improper to at-
tempt to coerce all patients to join the Republican or Democratic party, or in
the case of the Soviet Union, to compel a patient to agree with the political
views of the state. It is quite another to hope that the medications change the
patient's view of reality that beforehand has them believing that squirrels are
talking to them, or that God has given them a mandate to kill. Studies have
shown that antipsychotic drugs can correct thought aberrations and return per-
ception, thinking, and speech to what would be called normal. See Hurt,
Holzman & Davis, Thought Disorder: The Measurement of Its Changes, 40
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1281 (1983).
126. Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 435 (1991).
127. See Melvin R. Shaw, Professional Responsibility of Attorneys Repre-
senting Institutionalized Mental Patients in Relation to Psychotropic Medica-
tion, 22 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 186, 190-92 (1989).
128. For example, drug therapy studies confirm that there is a definite
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Contemporary commitment laws are overexacting and leave many
individuals without the effective care needed. Courts appear to have
no particular expertise in evaluating the patients in these cases, caus-
ing a dilemma with a limited review on appeal when a trial court may
have misdiagnosed the patients. 29 Furthermore, such laws cripple a
limited-resource system by compelling participation, rather ineffec-
tively, in a legal contest rather than a curative. Because of this regime,
patients can be forced to wait for weeks or months for a court hearing
with no effective treatment.
30
From the patients' point of view, the last two centuries of institu-
tional treatment have fostered a constant struggle to be afforded fun-
damental human rights. Until fairly recently, patient consent to treat-
ment and protection against abuse or arbitrary confinement were not
high priorities in either the United States or England. In these two na-
tions, the governments' attention to the rights of patients with mental
illness lagged behind the need to establish a treatment system. Patient
rights were gradually recognized in two distinct scenarios: whenever
there were new medical discoveries that enabled individuals to enjoy
greater freedom, or when governmental reforms responded to a pro-
cession of horrible scandals. It took these scandals that shocked the
public conscience to create committees of visiting professionals and
citizens to inspect facilities for the mentally ill. These were called the
lunacy commissions.'
3'
positive relationship between an amount of a medication ("therapeutic dos-
age") and the beneficial effects. If a treating psychiatrist feels compelled to
administer a lower dosage due to the vaguarities of judicially constructed
"least restrictive" requirement, this might inhibit speedy amelioration from un-
restricted treatment. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 453 n.65.
129. See In re Joseph "0" v. Toraty, 245 A.D. 2d 856, 666 N.Y.S.2d 322
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997); In re Boggs, 136 Misc.2d 1082 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)
rev'd 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1st Dept. 1987) appeal dismissed as
moot, 70 N.Y.2d 981 (N.Y. 1988) motion for reargument denied, 71 N.Y. 2d
994 (N.Y. 1988); Francine Coumos, Involuntary Medication and the Case of
Joyce Brown, 40 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 736 (1989).
130. Hoge, Gutheil & Kaplan, The Right to Refuse Treatment under Rogers
v. Commissioner: Preliminary Empirical Findings and Comparisons, 15
BULL. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY. & L. 163 (1987) (finding that average time of de-
cision was four and a half months); DeLand & Borenstein, Medicine Court II:
Rivers in Practice, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 38 (1990) (finding an average of
twenty-four days).
131. See PHIL FENNEL, TREATMENT WITHOUT CONSENT 14 (1996). The
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The end of the millennia brings with it the fifth decade after having
ended the primacy of the large mental health institution, in one of the
most significant, government sponsored social movements in late
twentieth century American history, commonly termed "de-
institutionalization."' 3 2 This policy has meant freedom from the insti-
tutional treatment settings that were, in some cases, like prisons
fraught with discomforts and dangers. Of course, the community
treatment and support systems, to ensure that patients maintained their
therapeutic regimens, were also necessary; but unfortunately were not
developed in a coordinated fashion with the closing of the institutions
and the discharge of patients. 133
This change has created IMI patients who can function normally in
the community as long as they are able to maintain therapeutic levels
of medications and receive remedial measures when therapeutic con-
ditions fail. The problem with the current system is that without the
constant supervision formerly provided by the institution, patients of-
ten stop taking their medications and mentally decompensate, thereby
needing more intensive care. Compounding this problem of an expe-
ditious return to normalcy and community living, during the last three
decades courts have imposed an intense level of adversarial due proc-
ess on psychiatric treatment for individuals deemed incompetent to
appointment of the Lunacy Commission of 1815, and its limited legislative
precursor, the Madhouse Act of 1774, began the English tradition of govern-
mental supervision for care of the mentally ill. An example of this evolution
in the United States was the Utica-Marcy Act of 1842. This law created the
State Lunacy Commission that would later become a state agency and then a
constitutionally established department of state government, the New York
State Department of Mental Hygiene, pursuant to the state constitutional re-
forms of Governor Al Smith. See David B. Schwartz, Quality Assurance in
the Asylum, QUALITY OF CARE NEWSLETTER 6 (June 1983); "The Department
of Mental Hygiene, as distinguished from the institutions under its control is a
lineal descendant of the Lunacy Commission established by law in 1889 ....
In 1912, the Lunacy Commission became the State Hospital Commission ...
and in 1927 the Department of Mental Hygiene was organized under a single
Commissioner to whom was granted all the power previously exercised by the
Commission." The Care of the Mentally Ill in New York, supra note 65, at 12.
132. This term was coined to describe the closing of the large institutional
mental hospitals beginning in the 1950s. See Moynihan, supra note 61, at 19.
133. See ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM 70 (1990); see also
DAVID A. ROCHEFORT, FROM POORHOUSES TO HOMELESSNESS: POLICY
ANALYSIS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 228 (1993).
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participate in their treatment. In the absence of a plan for future treat-
ment of a patient, the current system converts to a crypto-criminal
model that does little more than stigmatizes a patient as "dangerous"
and assigns a lawyer to be an adversary to all treatment while awaiting
a congested court to hear the case. The mental stability necessary to
live autonomously would be furthered if the patient had a plan, in the
form of a Nexum, a mental health advance directive, to resume his
medication and treatment, without having to obtain judicial permis-
sion.
IV. UTILITY OF THE ADVANCE DIRECTIVE
In Homeric legend, the Odyssey captures the essence of self-
determination. In one of his many adventures as the cunning Odysseus
(later called Ulysses by the Romans) devised a method to ensure his
survival. Although he wanted to listen to the sweet, but highly dan-
gerous, songs of the Sirens, he knew that those who dared to listen in-
evitably lost all rational control over their judgment and succumbed to
the Sirens' seductive invitation to approach closer. Those who ap-
proached faced certain death by crashing onto the shoals. Odysseus in-
structed his crew to tie him to the ship's mast and not release him, no
matter what he said or ordered them to do. Odysseus also instructed
the crew to put wax in their own ears to avoid hearing the Sirens.
Odysseus' authority and foresight to issue an order, in advance to his
crew, enhanced his own well-being for the time when he knew he
would lose control of his right mind. Temporarily delegating his
autonomy preserved Odysseus' life and his ultimate authority to com-
mand the ship while allowing him to experience something unsur-
passed. Was Odysseus' power diminished or enhanced? Avoiding a
known or likely encounter with death cannot be deemed an unreason-
able bargain, especially when the return was one of the greatest ad-
ventures of the Odyssey.
134
134. [Circe] warned [Odysseus] that he must next pass the Island
of the Sirens, whose beautiful voices enchanted all who sail near.
Now, they sat and sang in a meadows among the heaped bones of
sailors whom they had drawn to their death. "Plug your men's
ears with bees-wax," advised Circe, "and if you are eager to hear
their music have your crew bind you hand and foot to the mast,
and make tiem swear not to let you escape, however harshly you
may threaten them." As the ship approached Siren Land, Odysseus
took Circe's advice, and the Sirens sang so sweetly, promising him
foreknowledge of all future happenings on earth, that he shouted
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In ancient Roman Law the Nexum became the first form of contract
Its great significance was that it marked a transition from law based on
status imposed by social or political hierarchy, to one empowering in-
dividuals through voluntary relationships to define and choose mutual
rights enforceable by.civil law. Nexum formed the bond that legally
linked relationships, albeit at first mostly one of an economic variety.
Nevertheless, it "cannot be doubted that [the Nexum] constituted the
stage in the history of Contract-law from which all modem concep-
tions of contract took their start." 135
Although the concept of state protection of autonomy was a feature
of Greek philosophy and culture, this marked the beginning of its
manifestation and availability to the general citizenry. Initially based
on economic principles, over time, the Nexum extended to all aspects
of appropriate relationships and agreements. By emulating the exam-
ple of Odysseus and following the format of the Nexum, a new form
of agreement would be created. It enhances the unilateral testamentary
"living will" to a bilateral contract, permitting a patient to give ad-
vanced medical consent and solidifying a therapeutic alliance between
the patient and health care provider.
It is national policy to encourage and enhance patient autonomy by
means of advance directives. 136 An advance directive is a contingent
to his companions, threatening them with death if they would not
release him; but, obeying his earlier orders, they only lashed him
tighter to the mast. Thus the ship sailed by in safety, and the Si-
rens committed suicide for vexation.
ROBERT GRAVES, 2 THE GREEK MYTHS 361 (1960); see also Paul S. Appel-
baum & Warren F. Schwartz, Minimizing the Social Cost of Choosing Treat-
ment for the Involuntary Hospitalized Mentally-ill Patient: A New Approach to
Defining the Patient's Role, 24 CONN. L. REV. 433, 443 (1992).
135. See generally SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS
CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO
MODERN IDEAS 340-43 (1861).
I know nothing more wonderful than the variety of sciences to
which Roman Law, Roman Contract-law more particularly, had
contributed modes of thought, courses of reasoning, and a techni-
cal language. Of the subjects which have whetted the intellectual
appetite of the modems, there is scarcely one, except Physics,
which has not been filtered through Roman jurisprudence.... This
part of Roman law which has had most extensive influence on for-
eign subjects of inquiry has been the law of Obligation, or what
comes nearly to the same thing, of Contract and Defict.ld.
136. See Federal Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395cc(f)(3); Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, 9 U.L.A. 222 § 2(a)(b)
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set of instructions in the event a person's judgment becomes so im-
paired that they are not able to function for themselves. Advance di-
rective statutes for general health care exist in all fifty states and nu-
merous territories. Since most of these statutes "permit revocation of
the living will by act or statement regardless of the drafter's mental or
physical condition,"' 37 they are inappropriate for most cases of inter-
mittently mental illness. This is why twelve states have advance di-
rectives that address the special circumstances of mental illness where
all laws proscribe revocation where a person is incompetent. 3
Promoting the use of advance directives is a matter of federal health
care policy pursuant to the Patient Self-Determination Act. 139 The pur-
pose of this law is to enhance patient autonomy and reduce unneces-
sary delay and expense in rendering health care.' 40 The right of an in-
dividual to control health care for the body and mind during periods of
224-5 (West Supp. 1996).
137. Roberto Cuca, Note, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps Toward A Self-
Binding Psychiatric Advance Directive Statute, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1152,
1158 (1993). "This reflects the belief that it is better to err against patient's
wishes by continuing, rather than withdrawing, life-sustaining treatment." Id.
But, in the case of a person who mentally deteriorates to the point of incom-
petence and risks reinstitionalization, the effect is the opposite from continuing
treatment. New York State's advance directive statute is a good example of
the inappropriateness of a general health instrument for mental health care.
Under its terms and interpretation, the advance directive becomes void upon
simple revocation or objection from an incompetent patient because of a strong
presumption of competency that cannot be ignored by a court order. Of
course, for the majority of patients with severe mental illness, there is an un-
awareness and denial of their own illness and revocation of the advance direc-
tive. Obviously, this contradicts the very purpose for having an advance di-
rective, namely to spring into effect and expeditiously render treatment when
mental illness is severe enough to debilitate a patient's decision-making. See
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW, § 2985.
138. Twelve states have specialized advance directive statutes for persons
with mental illness: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Utah. See Chart A for
a comparison of the principle characteristics of these statutes.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(3) ("An adult or emancipated minor may
give an individual instruction ... to take effect only if a specific condition
arises.").
140. "The truth is that 'autonomy' originated from Kant, and that it was
Kant who called attention to the concept." GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 299 (1967).
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inability to make competent decisions, is an important extension of an
ancient right of autonomy.' 4' In philosophical terms, it is the exercise
of personal free will. Legal competency is the hinge of the law that
separates a government's obligation from protecting an individual's
decision to one protecting the individual from his decision. 42 Consent
is not only the prime mover in personal choice on fundamental mat-
ters, but it is also the "sheet anchor" of democracy itself.
43
The state has a traditionally strong interest in encouraging patients
to make decisions when they are competent. Consent means the "exer-
cise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice to do
something proposed by another. It supposes a physical power of acting
and free use of those powers."'144 Health care autonomy intrinsically
requires that the patient be offered a primary role in the prescription of
care, however, this role may be limited by law, professional medical
standards, and ethics.
41
141. See George J. Annas & F. H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Cul-
ture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the US., the UK., and Japan,
20 AM. J. L. & MED. 357, 358, 369 (1994); George J. Annas & Jean E. Dens-
berger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: "Autonomy v. Paternal-
ism," 15 TOLEDO L. REv. 561, 565 n. 13, 14 (1984). Autonomy has spawned
new constitutional "prenumbral" rights, including the "right of privacy," that
protects individuals from state intrusion on matters of family decisions con-
cerning reproduction, contraception, and abortion. See Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971). It has
also been applied to refuse medical treatment. The United States Supreme
Court declared a constitutional foundation for two aspects of health care con-
sent - the right of a person to give or withhold consent in terminal treatment
cases, the so-called right to die case, Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261 (1990),
and in a case of involuntary civil commitment of a person with serious mental
illness, Zinermon, 494 U.S. 113.
142. See Glass, supra note 20, at 5.
143. See LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 71 (Mario M. Cuomo & Harold Holzer
eds. 1990).
What I do say is, that no man is good enough to govern another
man, without that other's consent. I say this is the leading princi-
ple--the sheet anchor of American republicanism. Our Declaration
of Independence says: That to secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.
Id.
144. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th Ed. 1990).
145. See Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L.
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In the history of Western law, especially from the Enlightenment to
the present, the invocation of these legal rights and privileges turns
upon the determination of a person's competence. This level of com-
petence is determined by a court, or someone recognized by law as
able or obliged to do so. In mental health care today, the determination
of legal competency is probably the "central issue in bioethics.' 46 The
issue is synonymous with the struggle for personal autonomy, par-
ticularly with the revolutionary changes in mental health care from the
constrictions of the large asylums to the freedoms of outpatient care in
the community.
The determination of legal competence is a recognition that an in-
dividual may or may not exercise certain legal rights. The law pre-
sumes adults are competent, for without this presumption, making
competency decisions for every significant decision a patient makes
would be impossible and absurd. 47 The law's determination of a per-
son's incompetency is seldom tied to a particular mental or physical
condition per se. Rather, the determination is defined functionally. It
can be applied to any condition or circumstance that significantly dis-
ables a person's mental processes of thought and rational decision-
making. 148 However, competency may vary with the factual situation,
the legal jurisdiction and the particular culture. A common example of
this type is medical consent, given a special name of "informed con-
sent.' '149 "Informed consent" requires the treating physician to impart
or explain the medical procedure in layman's terms (the "reasonable
prudent patient" standard) so that the medical decision, with its risk
and benefits, is adequately understood. 50 Only with an adequate ex-
planation of this relevant information in the context of "informed con-
sent" can a patient competently decide to consent or refuse the rec-
ommended course of complex medical treatment.
REv. 345, 346 (1996); see also Paul S. Appelbaum et al., INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 21-26 (1987).
146. Fennel, supra note 131, at 1-2.
147. See RUTH R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 288 (1986).
148. See Glass, supra note 20, at 5, 6.
149. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 722, 780, n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied 409 U.S. 106 (1972).
150. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH, § 2805-d; Innucci v. Bauersachs, 607
N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); see also Thomas A. Moore, In-
formed Consent: Part II, 214 N. Y. L. J., 3 (Oct. 3, 1995).
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Another example is the law pertaining to sexual consent, where a
bright demarcation line exists between legal and illegal acts, even
when it is difficult to determine the facts surrounding consent. It is
instructive that children below a certain age are considered per se un-
able to give consent, despite their subjective abilities. Yet, even this
objectively bright line has become fuzzy in contemporary times. In
certain situations covering sexual rights, competency for medical and
mental health care is granted to children.' 51 For example, there is also
a strong movement to grant broader sexual rights to persons with
mental retardation. A person with mental retardation may be legally
competent to make certain decisions about engaging in sexual behav-
ior of a simpler nature, such as sexual petting, while simultaneously
not be competent to engage in sexual intercourse.1
5 2
Competency for sexual consent can vary with the particular juris-
diction,15 especially with the culture changes over the centuries.
154
Thus, to some extent, the legal definition of competency reflects the
legal establishment, traditions and customs of the courts, the legisla-
ture and contemporary culture. To that extent, in marginal cases, these
group values will trump or circumscribe some autonomy of the indi-
vidual. Other examples of situational competency could be hypothe-
sized in terms of different medical treatments that vary greatly in
terms of their complexity, difficulty of comprehension, and their at-
tendant risks of further debility or death versus the expected
benefits. 56 Receiving professional advice or help usually increases or
enhances a person's ability to make these decisions. In questionable
151. See Bellotti v. Baird, 450 F. Supp. 97, 103-05 (D. Mass. 1978).
152. See PAUL F. STAVIS & LESLIE WALKER-HIRSCH, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
ACTIVITY, A GUIDE TO CONSENT (Robert D. Dinerstein, Stanley S. Herr, Joan
L. O'Sullivan, eds. 1999).
153. See Clarence J. Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Sexual Behavior and
Mental Retardation, 17 MPDLR [MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW
REPORTER] 448, 451-54 (1993); Clarence J. Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Sexu-
ality and Mental Retardation: Unmet Challenges, 32 MENTAL RETARDATION
255, 259-62 (1994).
154. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 13-15 (1995).
155. See Glass, supra note 20, at 7.
156. See President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine, Biomedical and Behavorial Research 20-21 (1998) [hereinafter




cases, this advice can make the difference between being found com-
petent, retaining the right of self-determination, or submission to the
inadequately responsive judicial process.
The law does not grant an individual the right to be so mentally ill
that the manifestations of the disease cause actions that might be of-
fensive to public sensibilities or are likely to result in more serious
anti-social acts." 7 Both in its police and parens patriae power, the
state may use reasonable means to protect those whose ability to make
decisions is impaired while restoring that decision-making to a com-
petent level. In fact the state imposes a general duty on itself and its
citizens to behave rationally in their decision-making. There is no
more ubiquitous legal standard than that of "reasonableness." Reason-
ableness is the heart of civil law, and defines the minimal level of be-
havior for government under the Equal Protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 58 Justice Benjamin A. Cardozo best expressed the
need to possess a sound, reasoning mind in order to make personal
health care decisions in Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y Hosp.1
59
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what should be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is
liable in damages . . .This is true, except in cases of
emergency where the patient is unconscious, and where
it is necessary to operate before consent can be ob-
tained.
6,
The synthesis of this personal liberty carries with it some obligation
to make healthful decisions. "Under ancient Greek law (from which
medical ethics and practices descended) physicians not only had a
duty to treat those with illnesses, but citizens had an equal duty to ac-
cept that treatment, in order to maximize their functioning in
society.' 6 ' The state has a strong interest in a rational citizenry and in
minimizing the effects of mental illness. However, the state must re-
157. See supra note 37; see also RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT,
MADNESS IN THE STREETS 256-61 (1990).
158. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980); see also San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
159. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
160. Id. at 93; People v. Medina, 705 P. 2d 961, 968 (Colo. 1985).
161. Robert D. Miller, Advance Directives for Psychiaric Treatment. A
View from the Trenches, (in press) (on file with the author).
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member that hospitalization of a patient without effective treatment is
arguably a form of preventive detention, 162 or possibly a tort. 63 Pa-
tients who refuse treatment have more reports of violence on others
with whom they are hospitalized, require significantly higher costs,
take a disproportionately high amount of mental health resources,
and result in longer hospital stays and increased incidence of home-
lessness.' 65 These interests can be united through an integrated, state-
sponsored Nexum; but only if the state can legally use incentives and
other means to encourage its use by patients who routinely receive
services from the mental health system.
Other state interests include providing adequate due process, cost-
efficient services, and confirmation that the services, including any ju-
dicial proceedings, are therapeutically effective. In appropriate cir-
cumstances, these state interests may transcend the individual's pref-
erence at the time an advance directive takes effect.' 66 However, there
is no particular constitutional requirement that competency to consent
or refuse psychiatric treatment be litigated in a court of law, especially
for standard medications that have been approved for use by the Food
and Drug Administration and are routinely prescribed for particular
illnesses. 167
Determination of a patient's decision-making competency should
conform to law based on medical practice and generally accepted
162. See Alan Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists
Should and Can Make it Work, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 361 (1981).
163. See TORREY, supra note 2, at 43-60.
164. See Shelly Levin et al., A Controlled Comparison of Involuntarily
Hospitalized Medication Refusers and Acceptors, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY. &
L. 161, 169 (1991). Although this study failed to find any difference in
lengths of hospital stay between refusers and accepters of psychiatric medica-
tion, others have also found "that refusers have significantly less insight into
their illness, less awareness of the rationale for their treatment, and less confi-
dence in the abilities of the ward staff ... [and they] are significantly more
likely to be restrained than accepters." Paul S. Appelbaum & Steven K. Hoge,
The Right to Refuse Treatment: What the Research Reveals, 4 BEH. SCl. & L.
279, 286 (1986).
165. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Legal Aspects of Clinical Care for Severely
Mentally I11, Homeless Persons, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY. & L. 455, 461
nn.52-53 (1992).
166. See Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with
Mental Illness, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 57, 89 (1996).
167. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-27.
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medical judgment. Common sense and experienced, physicians should
defer to a patient's choice, giving it widest berth when a choice is con-
sistent with good practice, restoration of health and functioning, re-
duction of suffering, and reasonable economic efficiency. Conversely,
a patient's competency should be questioned when a decision to refuse
medical treatment does not conform to the medical condition and pa-
tient circumstances. This has been termed a "sliding scale" of compe-
tency, "therapeutic jurisprudence" or an "important distinction be-
tween assent and objection." The important aspect of this approach is
that it permits the patient maximum autonomy in decision-making,
even when mental illness puts one's decision-making capabilities in
the marginal or doubtful range.'
68
This would also make the design of the Nexum more effective be-
cause it would conform with traditional contractual principles. Courts
generally judge the "reasonableness" of contracts, rather than evaluate
the competency of the contracting parties. Competence to participate
in a Nexum would be required at the time of execution. This can be
easily performed by a physician, or other legally qualified person un-
der statute or case law to make a clinical judgment of decision-making
competence. As found in contract law, the Nexum could be termi-
nated when the principal again attains mental cmpetence. 169 This
would be consistent with presumptions about adult competency and
deference to both personal choice and clinical judgment, while also
consistent with state's interest under its parens patriae power
that the injury to autonomy values produced by inter-
ference with individual self-determination should be
tolerated only to prevent the greater injury to the indi-
vidual's welfare that would occur by allowing incom-
petents to make such decisions. We should hesitate to
interfere with a patient's assent to a treatment recom-
mended by his physician since the physician's recom-
mendation ordinarily provides stronger evidence that
the patient's choice, rather than being injurious to his
welfare, will further it. In contrast, an objection to rec-
ommended treatment may provide greater justification
168. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Dis-
tinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 21 (1991).
169. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Per-
spectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1775 (1992).
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for conducting an inquiry into competency.
170
This should be viewed as beneficial persuasion, not as undue coer-
cion. Research shows that denial of mental illness is the most com-
mon reason for refusal of clinically appropriate treatment.1 7' As Chief
Justice Burger expressed, "one who is suffering from a debilitating
mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty or
free of stigma."'
172
The law can legitimately give a greater measure of deference to the
proactive treatment side involving marginal questions of patient com-
petency. Otherwise, the law plays into the rejection of treatment and
lack of awareness symptomology of some mental illness by providing
supports, such as a paid advocate, for the patient's erroneous view of
reality and his or her best interest. 173 We no longer live in an era where
state policy is to repopulate its institutions; quite the opposite, states
are eager to close them forever. There is no longer an abundance of fi-
nancial resources for either health or mental health care. The federal
and state governments are desperately searching for ways to avoid
rendering expensive care, and the new era of "managed care," for both
health and mental health treatment is primarily focused on this ap-
proach. 74 From this perspective, based upon maximizing reimburse-
ment from public monies or insurance gets intensified due to these
funding squeezes or incentives. This makes the rendering of care for a
person with intermittent mental illness more difficult because there are
fewer resources to deal with judicial processes to validate a persons
treatment requirements. 175 For many of the intermittently mentally ill
170. Winick, supra note 168, at 43-44.
171. See Robert D. Miller, Symposium on Coercion, An Interdisciplinary
Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and The Law: III. Coercion Confine-
ment and Treatment: The Continuum of Coercion: Constituitional and Clinical
Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENV. U.
L. REv. 1169, 1199 (1997).
172. Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 (1979).
173. There is increasing evidence suggesting that treatment refusals among
the seriously mentally ill are symptomatic of the disease. See Ciccone et al.,
Right to Refuse Treatment: Impact of Rivers v. Katz, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD.
Psy. & L. 203, 204 (1990); see also Bloom et al., An Empirical View of Pa-
tients Exercising Their Right to Refuse Treatment, 7 INTL. J. L. PSYCHIATRY
315 (1984).
174. See John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion in
Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L. J. 359, 368-77 (1996).
175. Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health
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managed care plans will be planned denial of care.
Legal adjudication has become so mired in adversarial procedures
and politics that paradoxically rendering effective treatment is threat-
ened. 7 6 Limits can be placed on patient's treatment choices. A pa-
tient's desire to be treated, or to refuse treatment, can be limited by
other governmental or profession interests as with cases of unapproved
"experimental" drugs, human subject research, when a patient's re-
fusal is a pretext for an attempt at suicide, or when professional ethics
forbid treatments. 77 When a person becomes mentally incompetent, it
is legally and clinically equivalent to being comatose because there is
Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L. J. 315, 315-
23 (1996).
For generations, mental health advocates have bitterly complained
that health plans of every kind discriminate in their coverage of
mental health conditions. Compared to physical health care,
mental health care has been subjected to stricter limits on utiliza-
tion, higher co-payments, lower benefits caps and more restricted
types of offered services. For people with more severe mental ill-
nesses, such as schizophrenia, access to appropriate services such
as psychiatric rehabilitation is even more problematic, and the
level of unmet need is truly staggering. These unmet needs result
not only in individual suffering and increased use of involuntary
interventions, but also in social consequences like homelessness
and increased levels of addiction.
Id.
176. Samuel J. Brakel, Legal Schizophrenia and the Mental Health Law-
yer: Recent Trends in Civil Commitment Litigation, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 3, 4
(1988).
In no field of law is the divisive, dualistic character of America's
legal system more apparent than in the field known as mental dis-
ability law. There legislatures, courts, and scholarly tradition have
combined to produce an unwieldy amalgam of general principles
and particularized provisions so riddled with internal conflict as to
justify a diagnosis of florid legal schizophrenia. In this field of
law, the state's parens patriae competes with its police power; the
patient's right to treatment coexists (all so uneasily) with the right
to refuse it; the therapist's obligation to preserve client confidenti-
ality militates against the duty to warn others; the psychiatrist's
wish to treat is undercut by legal compulsion to deinstitutionalize
or to refrain from institutionalization altogether; while the pressure
on the provider/administrator toward early release increases the
risk of legal liability; and the doctrine to deliver least restrictive
treatment threatens the disabled with the reality of being subjected
to a regimen that retains most of the coercion and restraints of the
institutional setting, but without the treatment, or worse of being
left with the unfettered freedom to deteriorate and die in the
streets.
Id.
177. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 79 (1997).
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no treatment decision upon which a physician, hospital, or other pro-
vider can reliably act. In defining this incapacitated state, the law has
traditionally used the term "incompetent." 178 The President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavior Research summed up the problems of judicial review of
medical determinations
Furthermore, resorting to the courts to adjudicate in-
competency - that is, to confirm the patient's lack of
decisional capacity - is often so burdensome to both
providers and patients or to their families that there is a
tremendous reluctance to undertake it. Even when an
adjudication of incompetency is sought, the proceed-
ings are in many cases so perfunctory and/or deferential
to the professional expertise of providers that the role
of the courts amounts to little more than pro forma rati-
fication of what was already apparent to health profes-
sionals. Frequently . . . it appears that the process of
judicial review is merely a formality. Judges may not
feel that they are able to add very much to the decision
already reached by those most intimately involved,
particularly in cases that are brought simply to obtain
judicial sanction for an agreed course of conduct.
7 9
Patient self-management is widely accepted today as the preferred
method of treatment, i.e., a self-guardianship. Patients can be educated
as to the onset of their condition, as well as what has been successful
treating them in the past.' 80 The IMI patient can be given the supple-
mental supervision needed to decide on the type and dose of drugs that
will best help, and to execute a Nexum in the event that they need as-
sisted outpatient treatment. 18' Congress has also spoken clearly in fa-
vor of promoting the use of advance directives through the Patient
Self-Determination Act (PSDA).
The goals and concerns [of the Act] can be conceptu-
alized in terms of process values and outcome prefer-
ences. The goal of empowerment and the concerns
about patient anxiety, comprehension, coercion, mean-
178. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 115, at 432.
179. President's Commission, supra note 156, at 175, 186.
180. See Akihiro Takai, et al., Insight and its Related Factors in Chronic





ingless formality, and uniform information each ad-
dress the process of decision-making rather than the
specific decision itself. That is, they reflect an over-
arching objective shared by many persons involved
with the passage of the PSDA that individuals be al-
lowed to make their own decisions about the use or
nonuse of advance directives. For these persons, the
PSDA was intended to give patients accurate and uni-
form information without creating undue anxiety or
pressuring them to execute documents they either did
not understand or genuinely want ...They believed
that if given accurate and uniform information, more
patients would execute advance directives.
18 2
The state may not always have a compelling interest that overrides a
refusal to accept standard psychiatric treatment. 83 However, the state
interest in providing treatment to an incompetent person might be so
fundamental, such as promoting self-reliance, personal independence,
amelioration of delusional thinking, or an avoidance of a person's
complete or lifetime dependence on a state institution advance direc-
tive.'84 These interests legitimize a state interest without mandating a
"clear, convincing or compelling" interest to do so.For example, in-
creased insight through psychotropic medication may lead to better
self-control for the patient to prevent self-destructive or anti-social
acts.' 85
In exercising the state's parens patriae power, the court must bal-
ance a person's legal rights to self-determination with concern for
their best interests.
186
182. Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Direc-
tives: A History and Assessment of The Patient Self-Determination Act, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 249, 267 (1997).
183. See In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (NY Sup. Ct. 1991) (rec-
ognizing the right of the patient to reject certain medical procedures absent an
overriding state interest).
184. See Guardianship of Boyle, 674 A.2d 912, 914 (Me. 1996) (authoriz-
ing the Department of Human Services to treat patient a with psychotropic
drugs to protect patient from doing harm to herself or others, despite patient's
claim of right to personal autonomy).
185. See Robert C. Schwartz, Symptomatology and Insight in Schizophre-
nia, 82 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 227, 231 (1998).
186. See In re Roche, 687 A.2d 349, 351 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., 1996)
(citing In re R., 638 A. 2d 1274 (1994)) (reasoning that the balancing test is
necessary because "an adjudicated incompetent 'like a minor child, is a ward
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[T]he state has a legitimate parens patriae interest in
furthering the treatment of those who are mentally ill
by forcibly administering psychotropic medications
when the patient is not capable of making a sound deci-
sion in his own behalf.... It is the unquestioned right
and imperative duty of every enlightened government,
in its character of parens patriae, to protect and pro-
vide for the comfort and well-being of such of its citi-
zens as, by reason of infancy, defective understanding,
or other misfortune or infirmity, are unable to take care
of themselves.'
8 7
States should enact laws encouraging every individual with mental
disabilities to have advance directives to enhance care and to control
medical costs. 88 Recently, a federal court, in Haldeman v. Pennhurst
State School, recognized not only the need and advantages for persons
with mental disability to have an advance directive, but also encour-
aged states to use this effort as a vehicle to enhance civil rights and
appropriate treatment. 
189
Empirical studies have shown advance directives have significant
limitations. These limitations are particularly acute for persons who
become incompetent to make health or mental health decisions and
have not appointed a proxy agent. 190 Obviously, advance directives are
useful only when a valid one exists and the treatment provider knows
about it. Persons suffering from serious mental illness often lack nor-
mal resources, such as stable housing, knowledge of legal rights, and
the involvement of caring family or friends to encourage them to have
an advance directive. Typically, a patient with mental illness is not of-
fered the assistance needed to execute an advance directive for future
care, even though the need for psychiatric care is often more intense
and frequent than other groups who might be offered such an option
by their hospital or physician. This situation might be different for pa-
tients being treated within a state operated or licensed mental health
of the state, and the state's parens patriae power supports the authority of its
courts to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent that serve the incom-
petent's best interests."')
187. In Re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 353 (I11. 1994).
188. See BRUCE WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT 230 (1997).
189. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, No. Civ. A. 74-
1345, 1997 WL 835412, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1997).
190. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 182, at 250.
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system. Since most mental health care is rendered within a state oper-
ated or licensed system, and paid for by public monies, there is more
opportunity to discuss the advantages of an advance directive than in
general health care. An advance directive, like a Nexum, would more
likely enhance principles of beneficence with enhanced patient auton-
omy in the mental health context due to more frequent and closer rela-
tionships with the patient. 191
Fortunately, patients generally trust their physicians and are willing
to give them discretion to render treatment as requested, or to modify
it as necessary. 92 There is arguably a greater need to plan for future
mental health care, a notion that is supported by modem research on
the relationship between the biology of the brain and mental illness.
Research continues to confirm long held theories that mental illness
and impaired decision-making might have an organic connection for
certain persons with schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorders.
Decision-making incompetence is often inextricably and insidiously
intertwined with the symptoms and progress of certain diseases. In-
deed, "primary process thinking" is one of the hallmarks of schizo-
phrenia. It has been medically known and legally acknowledged 93 that
mental illness can impair the brain's awareness of the disease. 194 Sci-
ence is beginning to identify brain dysfunction that is involved in
mental illness and how it impairs insight into one's own illness.' 95
Advance directives are considered particularly appropriate in the
care of persons with mental illness because of the intermittent nature
of the diseases. 196 All fifty states have some form of an advance direc-
tive statute for general health care. 197 However, in the general health
191. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives
for Life Sustaining Treatment, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 882, 886-87 (1991).
192. See Ashwini Sehgal, How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want their
Advance Directives Followed, 267 JAMA 59, 59 (1992).
193. See, e.g. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE, § 9.01 (1999).
194. See E. Fuller Torrey, Protecting the Rights, the Person, and the Pub-
lic: A Biological Basis for Responsible Action in CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY
37, 39 (Clarence J. Sundram, ed. 1994).
195. See Xavier F. Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia,
17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 113, 129-32 (1991).
196. See Debra S. Srebnnik & John Q. La Fond, Advance Directives for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 919, 919-925 (July
1999); see also Paul Appelbaum, Advance Directives For Mental Health Care,
42 Hosp. AND COMM. PSYCHIATRY 983-84 (1991).
197. See infra Chart, Advance Medical Directives & Mental Health Treat-
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care system, there is no common point to persuade patients to make an
advance directive, except for long-term admissions to nursing homes
or possibly during hospital admissions. In contrast, a specialized stat-
ute for persons within the mental illness system would have the po-
tential for being a feature integrated into the routine events in a pa-
tient's life such as a discharge or transfer from a facility, rendering a
particular service, or during the composition or review of a patient's
service plan. But, advance directives for general health care are not
well suited for persons with IMI. 198 Most general health care advance
directives are aimed at terminal stages of health treatment where a pa-
tient is unlikely to be able to communicate, and is therefore unlikely to
revoke the document. However, for the IMI patient, most general
health care advance directive statutes do not differentiate between an
attempt to revoke by an incompetent patient and an actual revocation
by a competent patient.
Efforts to increase the prevalence of physical health advance direc-
tives seem to depend largely on increasing physician-patient commu-
nication. Indeed, many believe that this is what patients really want
and that advance directives can be used as a means of stimulating
meaningful communication and mutual respect. 99 Mental health ad-
vance directives have a greater potential for success in this regard than
those utilized in general health care because the patient's illness and
other conditions are more likely to recur intermittently. The patient, as
well as the attending physician, can therefore better describe and tailor
the terms of the Nexum. Thus, the Nexum can be used to settle in ad-
vance such issues as: types of medications and dosage ranges; meth-
ods for handling emergencies and notifications; preferences for par-
ticular hospitals and lengths of stay, physicians, or settings for care;
identification of dependent persons; willingness to accept "experi-
mental treatments '200 and a variety of other medical issues.20' Perhaps
most importantly, the Nexum can articulate subjective values of the
patient and define the therapeutic relationship with his or her physi-
cian. This can be used to maintain the consistency of unexpressed or
ment.
198. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 182, at 249-50.
199. See Srebnnik & LaFond, supra note 196, at 923.
200. Clarence J. Sundram, In Harm's Way: Research Subjects Who Are
Decisionally Impaired, I U. MD. L. REv. 601 (1998).
201. See Srebnnik & La Fond, supra note 196, at 924.
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202unforeseen treatments that are necessary.
An example of how an advance directive statute for general health
care can operate contrary to the needs of a person with severe mental
illness is the general advance directive law in New York State.203 This
statute gives legal effect to any nullification by a patient, whether that
patient is competent or incompetent to make decisions. Thus, a patient
who executes an advance directive for the very purpose of controlling
his care when incompetent to make a decision, will automatically nul-
lify it with any articulated refusal or withdrawal. As a result, the ad-
vance directive is useless in the usual case of the IMI patient. For ex-
ample, the author was consulted by an attorney; a female client would
become IMI, but recovered quickly with a certain psychotropic medi-
cation. During her periods of mental decompensation, she acted sexu-
ally inappropriate and highly promiscuous; in one instance undressing
in a busy shopping mall. She desired to execute an advanced directive
to address her plight, but the fact that she would deny her illness and
refuse her medication at its onset made using an advance directive
meaningless under New York Law.20 4
Empirical studies have shown that many other problems and limita-
tions of advance directives for general health care can be removed, re-
solved, or greatly ameliorated with specialized mental health advance
directives. It has been noted that "[p]roviding patients with accurate,
uniform and comprehensible information is a prerequisite for autono-
mous decision-making." 20 5 It also makes a difference how and where
the information is presented. Hospitals tend to implement advance di-
rectives in a perfunctory manner at both ends, i.e., in having patients
make them, and in honoring the directive if the hospital discovers its
existence for a given patient. Indeed, patients who have advance di-
rectives generally do not understand the document's purpose or appli-
202. Jessica Wilen Berg, et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L.
REV. 345,377 (1996).
203. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW ART. 29-C.
204. See Paul F. Stavis, The Health Care Proxy Law: Is it a "Catch-22"
for Many Persons with Mental Illness?, QUALITY CARE 2-3 (Sept-Oct. 1993);
see also Gary N. Sales, The Health Care Proxy for Mental Illness: Can it
Work and Should We Want it To?, 21 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
161, 172-74 (1993).
205. Larson & Eaton, supra.note 182, at 268.
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cation any better than patients who do not have one.2°6 Although most
patients would feel more comfortable constructing the terms of their
advance directive with their physician prior to a hospital admission,
physicians are reluctant to spend non-reimbursable time in such
meetings. Additionally, physicians understandably lack the legal
training to convert their clinical recommendations into what is essen-
tially a legal document. Yet, there is strong evidence that patients de-
sire to have advance directives, once they understand their uses and
advantages.
It is noteworthy that there is no evidence of coercion in getting pa-
tients to adopt advance directives, and this is true even for so-called
"vulnerable" populations of patients.20 7 There must be a distinction
made between use of coercion, which is inappropriate, and the use of
strong persuasion or inducements, which are permissible. If it is per-
missible for one's attorney to use maximum persuasion for a client to
adopt an advance directive, 208 it is certainly equally legitimate for the
state to do so in its role as parens patriae.
There are two problems that emerge regarding the execution stage
of an advance directive: making the treatment provider aware of the
directive, and honoring the terms incorporated within it. Both phases
of the advance directives have presented problems. First, physicians
are often unaware of the existence of an advance directive because,
among other reasons, they are rarely (less than six percent) docu-
mented in the patient's medical record. 20 9 However, when physicians
do know about an advance directive, they follow its terms seventy-five
percent of the time; the "twenty-five percent 'override rate' indicating
that when the physician's training and the advance directive conflict,
physician preferences generally prevail., 210 As seen in the twelve
states that have advance directives for mental health treatment, most
provide protection for physicians to render treatment that is consistent
these good faith and professional standards.
In terms of general health care advance directives, regrettably for
206. See id. at 271.
207. See id. at 275-76.
208. See Bruce J. Winick, Dealing with Client Denial and Resistance in the
Advance Directive Context: A Challenge for the Therapeutically-Oriented
Preventive Lawyer, (in press 1999).
209. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 182, at 280.
210. See id. at 279.
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both federal and state policies, one researcher predicts that "no amount
of intensive interventions can increase the use of written advance care
directives beyond twenty-five to thirty percent of the population.
'" 21
This should not be the case for mental health advance directives, be-
cause the mental health system is a self-contained, state-controlled bu-
reaucracy, regulated and funded with public funds (mostly Medicaid,
which has an elaborate tracking system for services). Also, IMI pa-
tients have repeated contacts with various treatment providers in the
mental health treatment system. These patterns of care give the mental
health system a unique opportunity to offer advance directives to pa-
tients under conditions that avoid the problems discussed above. For
example, while the general health care patient might never get aid
from their doctor in drafting an advance directive, the mental health
system can ensure that this is done during discharge from an institu-
tion, admission into an outpatient program or at some other point of
contact between patient and service provider. Moreover, since it is
necessary that the patient be certified as competent at the time of exe-
cuting an advance directive, usually by a simple clinical determination
rather than a judicial proceeding, the mental health system can easily
ensure that a physician performs this function.
There is a concern that some patients will listen to *the advice of
certain advocates with ideological anti-psychiatric biases who will ad-
vise them to use the advance directive to prospectively reject any psy-
chiatric treatment including the use of medications. However, such
fears are not likely to present a large problem for a number of reasons.
The state will have the distinct advantage of access to the patient with
its physicians and support staff, who can generally be more influential
on a patient's willingness to adopt advance directives. Advance direc-
tives that inhibit or prevent rendering necessary treatment early
enough to stem mental deterioration will leave the patient susceptible
to more drastic, and presumably less desirable alternatives, such as in-
stitutionalization, more serious interventions, or a greater likelihood of
a permanent disability. An advance directive must be a practical
document that comports with medical practice, ethics, and state laws
and regulations. In that regard, most states having a mental health ad-
vance directive statute provide forms that can be designed to reduce
their non-therapeutic uses.212 The sliding scale for patient competency
211. Id. at 278.
212. See Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care:
1999]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
proposed here is partially contingent upon the patient's acceptance of
the professionally acceptable standard of care, in effect, deterring
other anti-therapeutic advance directives.1 3 The patient must be made
to realize that use of an advance directive enhances not only his
autonomy and self-determination, but also enhances his stability in the
community program. Therefore, the patient must be persuaded to
agree to an advance directive that addresses his mental health condi-
tion and the inherent risks he faces. It is no advantage to have a ge-
neric refusal of all treatment; this only guarantees that treatment will
probably be rendered eventually, but it will come too late and with lit-
tle or no input or choice from the patient.
Finally, while it is clear that a patient cannot be coerced to have an
advance directive it might be a fair requirement as a condition of par-
ticipation in a program, it is appropriate for the mental health system
to offer certain incentives to the patient. Considerations such as hous-
ing and enhanced services can certainly be justified to avoid deterio-
ration, or the possibility of the patient losing a job or social integration
in the community. Additionally, it is clearly more appropriate to
choose a time when the patient is thinking most clearly and is favora-
bly disposed to having a Nexum. The determination of patient com-
petency by the physicians of the mental health system can act as a
gatekeeper in this regard. All of these approaches favor patient treat-
ment within a state mental health system and are consistent with fed-
eral and state policies to promote proper treatment and maintain pa-
tients in community programs.
Advanced planning by a Nexum can also serve the patient's inter-
ests in avoiding stigma.214 A patient should be involved in his or her
A Theoretical and Practical Overview for Legal Professionals, 34-55 (in
press).
213. See Bruce J. Winick, supra note 166, at 57, 81 n.88 (1996). This arti-
cle also suggests changing the terms of an advance directive to permit unfore-
seen but more advantageous treatments by analogizing this modification power
to the cy pres doctrine used in testamentary bequests. See id, at 91 n.7.
214. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and
the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 6, 31
(1995)
Incompetency labeling also can be avoided by encouraging indi-
viduals to make greater use of advance directive instruments and
health care proxies. These arrangements allow individuals to an-
ticipate the possibility of a future period in which their decision-
making capacity will be impaired and to execute a formal instru-
ment directing how decisions will be-made on their behalf or se-
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treatment since it is one of the most important aspects of his or her
life. 215 Being shut out of this decision-making is usually of greatest
concern to the patient. Patients are often more concerned with fairness
of the overall process, and less on having access to judicial review or
resources. 216 The latter appears to be more a defense to neglectful
treatment than a resort to any kind of particular wisdom or expertise
by the courts either on mental illness or the patient herself. What the
patient often perceives as the benefits of litigation over civil commit-
ment or compelled administration of psychotropic medication is really
a demand for more careful and dignified treatment. Rather than ap-
plying constitutional mandates theoretically, judges generally make
practical decisions about compelling a person to accept mental health
treatment, utilizing compassion and traditional values, looking at a
patient's competence, predictability, suicide potential, need for treat-
ment, and the opinions of loved ones, such as family or friends. In
practice, judges defer to clinical judgments and let physicians usually
make decisions; more medically informed decisions than the typical.
court hearing. 217 It does not seem surprising that when judges and phy-
sicians behave as would a reasonable parent, adversarial litigation di-
minishes.2 I8 Increased satisfaction with a system would promote phy-
sicians trusting patients and patients trusting physicians; for trust en-
genders cooperation 219 and cooperation enhances cure.
220
lecting a proxy, such as a trusted relative or friend, to make the
decision... Such advance planning avoids the need for state coer-
cion and incompetency adjudication with its accompanying label-
ing effects while preserving the individual's sense of dignity and
autonomy.
Id.
215. See Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith:
The Morality of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEH. Sci. & L.
295, 305 (1993); William Gardner, et al., Two Scales for Measuring Patients'
Perceptions of Coercion During Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEH. SCI. &
L. 307, 320 (1993).
216. See Miller, supra note 171, at 1174.
217. See id. at 1179.
218. See Harold J. Bursztajn, et al., Beyond the Black Letter of the Law: An
Empirical Study of an Individual Judge's Decision Process for Civil Commit-
ment Hearings, 25 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 79, 89-90 (1997); see
also H. Owens et al., The Judge's View of Competency Evaluations, 13 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 389 (1988).
219. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Deci-
sion Making: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
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Some have argued that a person cannot surrender his decision-
making authority irrevocably when clinically determined to be incom-
petent.221 However, this would be a serious denial of autonomy, an
especially ill-advised one that is clearly contrary to the patient's well-
being. When serious mental illness strikes, there is very often a loss of
insight into the illness or the need for treatment. Thus, it is highly de-
sirable, indeed essential, to incorporate irrevocability into such an
agreement. As discussed below, all of the twelve states with special-
ized mental health advance directives require or permit a patient to
have terms for irrevocability.
V. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
With knowledge, experience and foresight, Odysseus foresaw an
episode in his voyage calling for advanced planning because he knew
his decision-making would be so impaired that it could cause his death
-and the deaths of his crew. This insight helped him survive the experi-
ence of the Sirens. Indeed, his advance directive to his crew worked so
perfectly that it led to the Sirens destruction.
In personal decision-making, it is largely up to the individual to as-
sess risks and intelligently take chances, even when the possibility of
death might be high. Racing cars, climbing mountains, or even more
ubiquitous high risk activities such as skiing, scuba diving, sport para-
chute jumping, and driving an automobile or motorcycle, are consid-
ered normative non-objectionable personal decisions as long as the de-
cisions are competently made. In a "Madison Avenue" version of an
Odyssean arrangement, there are many public service commercials:
"Friends don't let friends drive drunk." The commercial suggests that
the keys to the vehicle should be taken from the intoxicated person.
This is the equivalent of tying the potentially drunk driver to the mast
for his own good and the safety of society. If the driver tells his
friends before becoming intoxicated "do not let me drive under any
circumstances if I am or appear to be intoxicated," it would expressly
be a modern version of the Odysseus contract.
REv. 379, 423-26 (1990).
220. See Bruce J. Winick, Symposium Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Ex-
planation of Coercion, Exploitation and the Law: 11I. Coercion, Confinement
and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. L. REv. 1148, 1161-62 (1997).
221. See, e.g. Dresser, supra note 230, at 787.
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The state may insist on limiting behavior based on a competency
test before granting a privilege to a citizen, such as requiring a license
for operating a motor vehicle, heavy machinery or possessing a pistol.
Sometimes private organizations require competency testing for ac-
tivities such as scuba diving or parachute jumping. There are times
when it is important to know whether a person has the mental or
physical competence to undertake a task, because his life and safety or
that of others might well hang in the balance. The ownership of fire-
arms is another example where some states have competency require-
ments, both physical and mental. The state may set general rules for
the safety of the individual and others, and deny privileges based on
mental or physical incompetency.
For the IMI patient, there will be alternating periods of competence
and incompetence, often depending on whether their psychotropic
medication regimen is being followed. During periods when a person
relapses into severe mental illness, the Nexum can bridge periods of
disruption in their lives, reduce the chances of rehospitalization, and
maximize personal autonomy. It is important to note that the Nexum
differs from other advance directives that have been called "Ulysses"
agreements where a patient's true desire to be "lashed to the mast" can
be questioned.222 The Nexum will not only be integrated within the
mental health delivery system to overcome some of the problems al-
ready discussed, but will feature an administrative adjudication proc-
ess that has proven to be more effective than a court for deciding is-
sues of patient competency and validity of the advance directive. This
administrative adjudication process has many advantages over a court.
This system is much more patient-friendly than a typical court because
two of its four panel members have direct experience in the mental
health area as family members, or even as former patients themselves.
An administrative adjudication system specifically tailored to de-
termine issues of competence and ideally suited for implementation of
the Nexum system, is already in place. In the first of its kind in the
nation, New York State created a Surrogate Decision-Making Program
(SDM), which has for the past thirteen years made decisions regarding
major medical treatments (surgery, intrusive diagnosis, etc.) for per-
222. See id.; see also Robert Cuco, Note, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps
Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric Advance Directive Statute, 78 CORNELL L.
REv. 1152, 1154 (1993); Perling, supra note 30, at 204; Winick, supra note
166, at 57.
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sons with a mental disability or who are deemed to be incompetent.
223
SDM is composed of four individuals including three professionals,
who have a personal interest or training in the care of persons with
mental disabilities.224 In addition, SDM has won two national awards
and has become a model for other states.2 25 Its decisions have been
speedy yet highly accurate. Of thirteen appeals taken from almost
four thousand cases decided, only one court found an insufficient rec-
ord for the SDM panel. The court ultimately agreed upon the finding
of incompetency after de novo review of the previous incapacity deci-
sion.
In the first ten years of operation and in very limited areas of New
York State, SDM has handled 3,561 cases involving 5,646 medical
procedures. Sixty-eight percent of the patients (2,242) resided in in-
stitutions while thirty-two percent (1,139) came from community resi-
dences or programs. Of thirteen appeals taken from almost four thou-
sand cases decided, only one court overturned the finding of incom-
petency made by the quasi-judicial panel. 226 The average time from
filing an application to receiving a decision was 6.3 days. However,
certain mandatory notice requirements extended this time period
which a Nexum could reduce. 227 An expedited decision is also avail-
able in appropriate cases. Over the past ten years, there were 582
(16%) expedited cases in the ten year caseload.228
The SDM program has other advantages that would remove several
barriers to the use of advance directives. For example, the SDM staff
would have the expertise and resources to collect all relevant patient
records from mental health system providers, as well as subpoena
223. See Clarence J. Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Obtaining Informed Con-
sent for Treatment of Mentally Incompetent Patients Under New York's Surro-
gate Decision-Making Law-Ten Years Later, INT'L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 107
(1999); Stanley S. Herr et al., Health Care Decision-Making for Persons With
Disabilities, 271 JAMA 1017, 1021 (1994); Clarence J. Sundram, Informed
Consent for Major Medical Treatment of Mentally Disabled People, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1368 (1988); Paul F. Stavis, Informed Consent: A New Approach
for Medical Surrogate Decision-Making, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 10, 1986) at 1.
224. See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE, § 80.05
225. "Innovations Award" (January 1991, No. RM-797) by the Council of
State Governments.
226. See Sundram & Stavis, supra note 223, at 120.
227. See id. at 121.
228. See id. at 120-21.
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power to obtain records from non-state sources such as private physi-
cians or hospitals. It could be a repository, a coordinator or a search
mechanism for a patient's Nexum. Liability based on a claim of a lack
of informed consent is greatly reduced because SDM is legally
authorized to issue informed consent in the form of a certificate that is
valid for a fixed period of treatment. It ensures the dignity of partici-
pation by the patient, who has a right to be present unless physically
unable, in which case a panel member would visit the patient before
the hearing. The cost of the program is almost negligible compared to
litigation.229
Although actual costs are difficult to define or obtain for mental
health litigation, one estimate of two court hearings to determine a
civilly committed patient's competence to refuse psychotropic medi-
cations-assuming a full adversarial proceeding with heavy and com-
plex burdens of proof-put costs in addition to the institutional care as
$13,000 and $19,000 respectively. This does not include the time of
state officials, expert witnesses or other incidental 
costs.2 30
The cost of a SDM hearing is far less. At the request of the author
the New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally
Disabled (Commission on Quality of Care), the state agency that ad-
ministers and funds the SDM system, made a rough estimate. By tak-
ing the costs and numbers of cases processed in the two busiest coun-
ties of New York State, the cost is very likely less than $500 per
hearing, the actual number was $392 (including the largest expendi-
tures, such as the cost of support by the Commission to the panels of
volunteers, subcontracts with county Dispute Resolution agencies, and
all travel expenses and service costs of the panels themselves.
2 3 1
To decide upon a simple medical procedure, a court proceeding
where the hearing was waived cost $1,800 in attorney fees for one
229. See Robert L. Sadoff, The Practice of Forensic Psychiatry: Perils,
Problems and Pitfalls, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 305, 309-14 (1998).
230. See Letter of Pat Johnson, Assistant Counsel Commission on Quality
of Care, on file with the author, dated November 15, 1999; and supra noes
115-117.
231. New York State Register, Nov. 3, 1999, at 9. "Regulatory Impact
Statement by the Commission on Quality of Care," paragraph 4. "Costs."
(Stating that in one case for a judicial hearing for a simple medical procedure
there was $1,800 in attorney fees alone, even though the hearing itself was
waived.)
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party to the proceeding alone.232 These costs compel a common sense
conclusion that an effective administrative dispute process run under
the auspices of a state agency is far less expensive than to a full judi-
cial hearing, and does the job better in most cases. In the minority of
cases where the issues are novel, contentious, or particularly suscepti-
ble to a full adversarial hearing, judicial appeal and a trial de novo is
available from the SDM determination. Further, there is no cost to the
patient or provider; the panel members are reimbursed for travel ex-
penses only, and the state provides the SDM staff.
SDM "patient-friendly" operates in a much more informal atmos-
phere that is less likely to intimidate the patient or staff, unlike a for-
mal courtroom. 233 Some commentators argue strongly for utilizing an
advance directive and SDM option based on the growing discipline of
law and economics. It seeks to minimize the costs of the decision-
making system to both the patient and the social system.23 1 This type
of analysis, and the performance of the judicial versus administrative
programs like SDM, leave little doubt that the latter performs better on
every indicator: accuracy, error reduction, participant satisfaction, low
economic cost, and most of all, maximizing patient autonomy. SDM
panel members are people with hands-on experience in the areas of
mental illness, dealing with patients on a personal level. Unlike a gen-
eralist judge who handles many different legal issues, SDM is highly
specialized and is solely concerned with the patient's rights and treat-
ment.
The Nexum, operating in the context of an alternative dispute reso-
lution framework, would be formulated through a team approach in-
volving the patient, his physician, program staff and any advocate or
friend the patient might want or feel comfortable having with him.
There would be two essential features. First, there would be a defini-
tion of either incompetence or another condition that makes the
Nexum spring to life and become operational. This definition would,
of course, have to be consistent with law and professional standards
232. See id.
233. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 40 (1950).
234. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Warren F. Schwartz, Minimizing the Social
Cost of Choosing Treatment for the Involuntarily Hospitalized Mentally-Ill
Patient: A New Approach to Defining the Patient's Role, 24 CONN. L. REV.
433 (1992). This economic approach to balancing rights and resources sug-
gests that legal procedures have distinct diseconomies in an increasingly re-
source-poor governmental physical and mental health care system.
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and ethics as well as operational and practical for treatment providers.
It will be individualized to the patient's needs and circumstances of
his treatment and may not only involve a medical or behavioral condi-
tion, but also the feature of a proxy where a trusted person or physi-
cian can declare the need for treatment or be used in a guardianship
fashion to declare the patient to be in need of treatment as per his or
her Nexum.
Second, the Nexum will specify to a reasonable degree the course of
treatment that has received the patient's consent. It may contain alter-
native treatments and should have language that permits for change
based upon unanticipated circumstances. In this regard, the Nexum
will have standardized provisions or it will be required by law to per-
mit review by an administrative adjudication panel for any disputes,
such as the determination of competency or divergence from the terms
of the advance directive for a showing of good cause. Beyond these
terms, there will also be standard legal provisions for revoking previ-
ous advance directives, a statement of general intent, a "hold harm-
less" provision for those assisting the patient or executing the advance
directive in good faith and with negligence or intentional misconduct,
etc.23
Up to this point, the philosophical and conceptual basis for the
Nexum has been developed. This section will introduce and explain
draft legislation (See Appendix C) for authorizing it. It will utilize as
its basis the two statutes in New York State - the advance directive
statute for general health care236 and Surrogate Decision Making
Committee (SDMC) statute for initial dispute resolution. 237 These stat-
utes have been chosen for three reasons: (1) New York and Texas are
currently the only two states that have an SDMC type program; (2)
New York's general advance directive law is typical of many and
contains all the essential legal elements; and (3) the familiarity of the
authority with both statutes particularly as an author of the SDMC law
and chief legal advisor to the program.
The chart of the twelve states with mental health advanced direc-
235. See Davis, supra note 98, at 52-54 (showing a multiple choice form
for advance directive) (McKinney 1988).
236. NY PUBLIC HEALTH ART. 29-C (McKinney 1988). This statute does
address treatment of mental illness, but permits revocation by a mentally in-
competent patient unless a court proceeding is brought and an order obtained.
237. NY MENTAL HEALTH ART. 80.
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tives compares ten characteristics. This first one, irrevocability while a
patient is incompetent as clinically, not necessarily judicially, deter-
mined, is the essential difference between mental health and general
health care advance directives. A variety of methods are available for
making a credible determination of patient competency without having
to resort to a court ab initio. Indeed, line 5 of Chart A gives a sum-
mary of these different methods. While half of the states (Alaska,
Idaho, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Utah) use courts as one al-
ternative method to determine competency, a clinical determination is
permitted by most states. Eleven of the twelve define incompetence as
the inability or incapacity to make or communicate mental health care
decisions.23s All of these formulae could be accommodated in the
Nexum, with the preference for either a patient's own definition of his
or her need for treatment or the appointment of a trusted person to
make that call which would then be ratified by treatment professionals
under law and their professional code of ethics.
239
Ten of the twelve states provide for a proxy. This is surely an option
that should be offered. In the Nexum it might also be used by a pa-
tient to delegate the power to a proxy to declare the patient to be in
need of treatment as specified in the Nexum. This is the most tradi-
tional method of surrogate consent. If the patient has strong trust in a
spouse, other family member, close friend, trusted lawyer, or even a
physician who is involved in the instant treatment, etc., it would be
advantageous for both the patient and the provider of treatment by're-
moving most uncertainty when the Nexum is executed. Of course, the
treating physician or provider would have to agree that the patient is
incompetent to make treatment decisions and that the treatment is ap-
238. See Chart A, Advance Psychiatric Directive State Statutes at line 4. 7'
239. George J. Annas and Joan E. Densberger, Competence to RefkSe
Medical Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 561, 584
(1984)
Competence is primarily a fact question that can be answered
without reference to medical expertise. Properly understood, a
relative, a friend, a nurse, or any other person familiar with the in-
dividual and the standard of competence should be able to make a
reasonable assessment ... What matters most in making a decision
about what will be done to the body of another is that the values
and will of the patient are honored.
Id.; see also Larson & Eaton, supra note 182, at 286 (citing the UNIFORM
HEALTH-CARE DECIsIONS ACT, § 5(c) (Pt. 1), which suggests placing decision-
making power with "an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for




propriate. 240 The issue of overriding the terms of the advance directive
is treated very differently among the twelve states, some requiring a
court to approve treatments unauthorized by the patient and others
permitting physicians to trump the advanced directive if the treatment
is contrary to customary practices or ethical considerations. This
problem is particularly suited to the Nexum because it will incorporate
an effective and well regarded quasi-judicial determination, that is es-
sentially like an administrative law process that has been held consti-
tutional for such purposes as making competency determination for
psychiatric treatment over objection from the patient. As a matter of
both ethics and practicality, it makes sense to provide some authority
to the treating physician to refuse to follow an advance directive based
on the physician's professional or personal ethics, or based upon cus-
tomary medical practice. Studies of advance directives have shown
that physicians will not deviate from the standards of the medical pro-
fession as they understand them, and will therefore ignore or modify
the expressions of the advanced directive accordingly. 24' A related is-
sue is whether there will be reasonable limits to liability for both the
provider of treatment and any proxy who follows the advance direc-
tive in good faith. Most of the twelve states provide for limited im-
munity from being sued for either refusing or rendering requested
care.
242
The issue of how the provider is alerted to the advance directive has
been problematic, especially for general health care since there are no
provisions for a central registry and a requirement that it be consulted
before treating a patient. For the twelve states with mental health ad-
vance directives, there is little improvement-all but one puts the re-
sponsibility on the patient to deliver it to the physician. 243 This is a
dubious proposition for someone who will probably, if not by defini-
tion of needing an execution of the terms of his or her advance direc-
tive, be mentally incapacitated and therefore unlikely to alter the phy-
sician. The Nexum offers an improvement in having a central registry
in the state office of mental health, or in a similar location that can be
240. Cf Parham, 442 U.S. 584.
241. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 182, at 267.
242. See infra, Chart, Advance Psychiatric Directive State Statutes at lines
8-10.
243. See infra, Chart, Advance Psychiatric Directive State Statutes at line
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easily accessed by physicians. Moreover, a physician, or a mental
health administrator, licensee or provider who was about to treat a pa-
tient would have a great incentive in doing so because it would make
the treatment situation, such as obtaining informed consent, easier and
more certain.
Providing an official form by statute or regulation is important. For
a mental health advance directive, this is essential as evinced by the
fact that ten of the twelve states provide a form in their statute. The
Nexum must contain certain provisions to make it effective. There are
two in particular that are necessary. There must be appropriate lan-
guage that refers disputes to the SDMC program, and more signifi-
cantly, there must be appropriate parameters of patient choice and
system guarantees. The patient must select treatments that are both ef-
fective and within professionally acceptable standards. The treatment
provider, either the state itself or an agent of the state, must render
treatment that does not significantly deviate from professional stan-
dards under constitutional law. 244 It obviously does not benefit a pa-
tient to request treatment that is not beneficial and effective, that will
be resisted to as anti-therapeutic by the treatment provider, or that will
fail to deter further mental deterioration and thereby jeopardize the
patient's freedom by being subjected to the civil commitment process
or some other form of compulsory treatment chosen by someone else.
Standardization of language will also avoid unnecessary ambiguities
on very important issues.245
There should also be a provision to protect physicians from having
to deviate from customary practices. As a quid pro quo for justifiable
refusal by a physician to treat the patient, some statutes require trans-
ferring the patient to another treatment provider. Studies have shown
that it is most likely for a physician to override advance directives
244. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
245. It is beyond the scope of this Article to produce a specific form or
language for the Nexum. The matter of a form is one that should be addressed
in a statute or regulations of the department of mental health. There are ex-
cellent examples of forms for a mental health advance directives in many of
the statutes in Chart, Advance Psychiatric Directive State Statutes infra, as
well as a very comprehensive form prepared by Joe Cooney of University Le-
gal Services and distributed by The Commission on Mental Health Services.
(May 17, 1999). See also Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for
Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and Practical Overview for Legal Profession-
als (in press 1999).
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where there is a conflict in treatment standards and patient prefer-
ences; in such instances, physicians usually prevail. 246 Thus, it would
be up to the patient's primary physician, or perhaps the patient's case
manager, to become aware of this problem and seek appropriate alter-
natives.
Finally, there is the important issue of making both the treatment
provider and the patient aware of the option of having an advance di-
rective. This problem has made advance directives appear
"irrelevant." 247 As discussed above, this is one of the biggest problems
preventing wide usage of advance directives within the general health
care/hospital system, a solution which might save as much as $100
billion in terms of end-of-life medical treatments.241 With patients be-
ing treated by the state's mental health system, however, there might
be greater success if there is a state program to strongly encourage
their use. Such patients would see various state-licensed treatment
providers routinely, especially to maintain their psychotropic medica-
tion regiment. Patients are much more likely to want an advance di-
rective if they can meet with their physician to discuss the
treatment. 249 They also might have case managers who could explain
the advantage of this option for their care and maintaining their life-
style. Attaining familiarity with the patient within the treatment sys-
tem, the reimbursement system and with program staff, advance di-
rectives could routinely be made a part of their patient discharge, ad-
mission, treatment and importantly records processes and automati-
cally brought to the attention of the respective treatment provider.
The Nexum would be an instrument that works within a "comfort
zone" of familiar or trusted individuals, using treatments that have
worked before and been found acceptable to the patient. The patient
would have to understand the needs of the treatment system and incor-
porate the judgments and advice of case managers and treatment pro-
fessionals to ensure that the advance directive is workable and accept-
able to others who will be involved in its implementation. This process
of advance planning would be empowering for the patient.250 The com-
246. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 182, at 279.
247. See id. at 280.
248. See id. at 282-92.
249. See id. at 274. "[M]ost studies indicate that patients overwhelmingly
favor receiving PSDA [advance directive] materials, especially if given by
physicians or nurses." Id.
250. See Winick, supra note 166, at 81-85.
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fort zone would also include a new administrative approach to resolv-
ing issues having to do with the advance directive and its implementa-
tion.
For the person with severe mental illness living in a community
with support services, the greatest danger to freedom is becoming in-
termittently incapacitated because of a failure to maintain stabilization
through medication. During cyclic periods where the patient is not
maintaining his medications, or the medication is no longer suppress-
ing psychotic symptoms, is it not the interests of the state and the pa-
tient to curtail the interruption in community freedom? The state has a
legitimate interest and a right to ensure both the welfare of the patient
and the good order of the community. The patient certainly gets no
therapeutic benefits from having a court hearing, which is largely de-
signed only to eliminate gross error in the state's determinations con-
cerning treatment.
Both of these interests can best be served by the patient's own exer-
cise of treatment preference, while competent, via an advance direc-
tive. The advance directive should be a workable arrangement that is
consistent within the range of professionally acceptable treatments and
the state regulated system of care and treatment. The result will be to
maximize patient autonomy and mental health, while minimizing the
social costs of treating the mental illness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The development of the contract can be characterized as the begin-
ning of economic freedom and a necessary precursor of civil liberty, if
not the charter in terms of permitting individuals to define their legal
interrelationships. It is no exaggeration to state that contract has been
a foundation stone of Western culture and society - one which permits
individual autonomy over the conduct of their personal and business
affairs.
The Nexum requires reasonable concessions from the patient and
the mental health treatment system. It asks the patient to choose
among professionally acceptable treatments and that the treatment
system promise to honor those choices in good faith, or present any
changed circumstance to a trustworthy and patient-friendly panel that
will decide the proper course of treatment using a combination of sub-
stituted judgment and patient best interests. If all goes well, the patient
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will get the treatments he or she finds acceptable, will minimize or in
many cases eliminate the likelihood of hospitalization, and reinforce
their place in the community, in their jobs or with their loved ones. In
exchange, the mental health treatment system will largely reduce the
need to turn to costly and ineffectual litigation and be better able to
render more effective and cost-efficient treatment. This will build a
therapeutic alliance with the patient and physician because both will
benefit from it.
These consequences resulted not of a plan, but of their own accord
in New York State's Pilot Study of an "assisted outpatient treatment"
law at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. There, coercion was
found to be totally unnecessary over the entire three-year course of the
study involving approximately 150 patients. Rather, physican-patient
relationships occurred naturally because both patient and treatment
system desired to avoid needless litigation. Together the physicians
and patients agreed to plans of treatment, which were bonded by in-
centives that dignify, not dehumanize, the patient. This proved to be
successful in maintaining all patients in the community since was
neither during the study, nor were there any instances of violence by
any patient. In a sense, this pilot study succeeded by its own failure. It
was ostensibly to test outpatient commitment procedures, but instead
created defacto advance directives of the Odyssean type. It is impor-
tant to note that this study included more than medical services such
as housing, case management, etc.
Patients feeling strongly about determining the
course of their treatment, or having particularly nega-
tive or positive feelings about a specific treatment, or
intervention, will have the option of making advance
decision that will effectuate their wishes. Doing so in a
way that the law will honor will provide a measure of
predictability that may reduce stress and anxiety that
might otherwise be devastating. Being able to plan in
advance about important matters with the assurance
that those plans will be respected and effectuated brings
a measure of ease that can permit the patient to pursue
happiness and attempt to secure the blessings of liberty
in a way that the anxiety and fear produced by uncer-
tainty in such matters might well prevent. Patients may
thereby be liberated to maximize their potential for a
healthy adjustment to life. Dealing with such an im-
portant matter in an effective way also predictably will
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promote patients' self-esteem, which may increase their
decision-making capacity generally and their ability to
act effectively.
Acting and being treated as self-determining indi-
viduals with authority over their own fate, instead of
powerless and incompetent victims of forces beyond
their understanding and control, can be therapeutically
advantageous. Restoration of mental patients to as high
a degree of community functioning as is possible in the
circumstances should be a significant goal of any sen-
sible system of mental hospitalization and treatment,
and this goal will be furthered by allowing patients to
make decisions. By contrast, being treated as an in-
competent subject of paternalism can foster feelings of
incompetency, reinforcing expectancies that mipht well
keep such patients in the psychiatric sick role.
Resources spent on litigation obviously subtract resources from
treatment and other services which are in desperate need. Courts have
been overly concerned about the type of abuse that is typical of a by-
gone government operated institutional system. What the courts do not
sufficiently appreciate, as Odysseus did, is that genuine freedom can
be enhanced, by a short period of restri,.tion to sustain a longer period
of stability, health, and longevity. Freedom to pursue happiness neces-
sarily includes the ability to do so in good health. Therefore, a per-
son's rights of autonomy ought to include the power to give sensible
permission to others that might result in a temporary restriction of
freedom. If such authority is given while the principal is competent
and when the rationality of its purpose is clear to those acting on the
principal's wishes, then the government authority shall promote it.
Neither Odysseus nor the crew under his command had any doubt
about what their King was doing, perhaps some were envious that they
could not also experience the Siren's sweetly singing. There should
also be no doubt that a patient can waive his rights to have a court de-
termine his competency in favor of doing it him or herself through a
contract with treatment providers backed-up by an administrative pro-
cess. Congress has established advance directives as national health
policy. The Nexum takes this concept one practical step further by
suggesting that they be made in a contractual form. In this way, the
251. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT 395 (1997).
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patient is bound to the treatment system, but also the treatment system
is bound to the patient. This is the classic contract where both parties
are given assurances that their preferences will be followed.
76 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
MODEL STATUTE
ARTICLE 83
MENTAL HEALTH CARE AGREEMENTS, AGENTS AND
PROXIES
§ 83.01 Legislative findings and purpose.
The legislature hereby finds and declares that timely access to
health care for people who are mentally disabled is an important ob-
jective for New York State. This goal is best achieved by preserving
and protecting the decision-making autonomy of persons who inter-
mittently become incapacitated to make mental health care decisions.
Persons with decision-making capacity to make mental health care de-
cisions for themselves should be given the opportunity to do so pro-
spectively for times when they cannot do so because of impairments
associated with mental or physical illness. This will ensure that health
care decisions are based on the best interests of the patient and reflect,
to the extent possible, the patient's own personal beliefs and values.
The legislature further finds and declares that the public interest will
be served by extending the availability to persons with recurring inca-
pacities caused by mental illness of a specialized advanced directive in
the form of a contract which incorporates the quasi-judicial surrogate
decision-making process of Article 80. Under this process a patient, in
cooperation with the state, or its licensed treatment providers, deter-
mines the conditions of his or her incapacity to consent to or refuse
medical treatment and the acceptable treatments that are consistent
with appropriate mental practices and applicable laws. If there are any
disputes, ambiguities or other issues which are not reasonably con-
trolled by the agreement then resort may be made to the Surrogate De-
cision Making Committee under article 80 of this chapter as to
whether the proposed treatment promotes the patient's best interests
and is consistent with the patient's values and preferences as articu-
lated in the agreement.
The Legislature finds that such a system will strengthen the surro-
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gate decision-making role of parents and others, such as family mem-
bers, while assuring that those individuals without available family
members have access to mental health care which they choose in a
timely and appropriate fashion.
§ 83.02 Definitions.
The following words or phrases, used in this article, shall have the
following meanings, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "NEXUM" means an agreement between a person with decision-
making capacity and the New York State Office of Mental Health, or
any one of its licensees, authorized agents or physicians designating
the terms of his or her incapacity due to the onset of mental illness and
those medically reasonable treatments that are acceptable to the pa-
tient under those circumstances. The state or its authorized licensee or
agent will agree to honor this agreement in good faith. In the case of
any dispute, ambiguity, or changing circumstances, the state or licen-
see will document such reasons for deviating and present the matter to
a Surrogate Decision Making Committee under Article 80 for a bind-
ing decision.
2. "Adult" means any person who is eighteen years of age or older,
or is the parent of a child, or has married.
3. "Attending physician" means the physician, selected by or as-
signed to a patient, who 'has primary responsibility for the treatment
and care of the patient. Where more than one physician shares such re-
sponsibility, or where a physician is acting on the attending physi-
cian's behalf, any such physician may act as the attending physician
pursuant to this article.
4. "Capacity to make mental health care decisions" means the abil-
ity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of health
care decisions, including the benefits and risks of and alternatives to
any proposed mental health care, and to reach an informed decision.
5. "Principal" means a person who has executed a Nexum.
6. "Agent" is a proxy decision maker appointed under the Nexum.
§ 83.03 Use of a Nexum agreement to specify incapacity, designate
acceptable treatments, appoint a health care agent or a mental health
care proxy.
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1. Authority to appoint agent; presumption of competence. A com-
petent adult may enter into a Nexum agreement that may: (a) specify
terms of decision-making incapacity associated with mental illness
and consequential need for treatment of mental illness; (b) designate
acceptable treatments for which this agreement will constitute valid
informed consent; or (c) appoint a mental health care agent to make
such decisions on the principal's behalf. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, every adult shall be presumed competent to execute a Nexum
agreement unless such person has been adjudged incompetent or inca-
pacitated to make decisions concerning the existence or a serious
mental illness and the need and consent to such treatment for that
mental illness by two physicians, or is currently under guardianship of
the person.
2. NEXUM; execution; witnesses.
(a) A competent adult may execute a Nexum agreement by signing
and dating it in the presence of two adult witnesses who shall also sign
the proxy. Another person may sign and date the Nexum for the adult
if the adult is unable to do so, at the adult's direction and in the adult's
presence, and in the presence of two aduft witnesses who shall sign the
Nexum. The witnesses shall state that the principal appeared to exe-
cute the proxy willingly and free from duress. If the Nexum appoints
an agent, then the person so appointed shall not act as witness to exe-
cution of the mental health care proxy.
(b) For persons who reside in a mental hygiene facility operated or
licensed by the office of mental health, at least one witness shall be an
individual who is not affiliated with the facility and, if the mental hy-
giene facility is also a hospital as defined in subdivision ten of section
1.03 of the mental hygiene law, at least one witness shall be a quali-
fied psychiatrist.
3. Restrictions on whom may be appointed as agent or proxy and
the limitations on such mental health care agent.
(a) An operator, administrator or employee of a mental hygiene fa-
cility or mental hygiene portion of a general hospital may not be ap-
pointed as a health care agent by any person who, at the time of the
appointment, is a patient or resident of, or has applied for admission to
such facility.
(b) The restriction in paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall not
apply to:
(i) an operator, administrator or employee of such facility or hos-
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pital who is related to the principal by blood, marriage or adoption; or
(ii) a physician, subject to the limitation set forth in paragraph (c)
of this subdivision, except that no physician affiliated with a mental
hygiene facility or a psychiatric unit of a general hospital may serve as
agent for a principal residing in or being treated by such facility or
unit unless the physician is related to the principal by blood, marriage
or adoption.
(c) If a physician is appointed agent, the physician shall not act as
the patient's attending physician after the authority under the health
care proxy commences, unless the principal expressly states in the
Nexum his or her preference for the physician to be the proxy.
4. Commencement of Nexum Operation and Execution of its
Terms. The terms of the Nexum shall commence, including the
authority of any agent appointed thereunder, upon a determination,
made pursuant to this subdivision of this article, that the principal
lacks capacity to make mental health care decisions and is in need of
care and treatment as defined in section 9.01 of this article.
5. Nexum, contents, form and terms.
(a) The office of Mental Health shall promulgate regulations and
policies to educate those treated by the state operated mental health
system, train personnel to assist patients to have a Nexum and to de-
velop a proper legal form of the Nexum. The Form shall include lan-
guage to:
(i) identify the principal, agent, if any and the representative or
licensee of the Department of Mental Hygiene;
(ii) if applicable, indicate that the principal intends the agent to
have authority to make health care decisions on the principal's behalf;
(iii) if no agent is appointed to make the decisions on the onset of
incapacity associated with mental illness and the need for treatment,
then the principal shall designate the terms of decision-making inca-
pacity, nead for treatment and those treatments that are acceptable and
prospectively consented to;
(iv) the representative of the Department of Mental Hygiene or
its licensee will ensure that the specifications of incapacity and treat-
ments designated as acceptable to the principal are practical, appropri-
ate under law and professionally acceptable standards or customary
and reasonable medical practices and agrees to honor the principal's
stated wishes in good faith and to refer any dispute, ambiguity or de-
viation from the Nexum to a Surrogate Decision Making Committee
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pursuant to article eighty of the mental hygiene law.
(b) The Nexum may include not only the principal's specific in-
structions about health care decisions, and limitations upon the agent's
authority, but it may also state the principle's wishes, personal values,
mental health care goals, or any other statements that would be perti-
nent and useful in interpreting and understanding the import and effect
of the Nexum either for the treating physicians and providers of care
or for the Surrogate Decision Making Committee in the event that is-
sues are presented to it.
(c) The health care proxy may provide that it expires upon a speci-
fied date or upon the occurrence of a certain condition. If no such date
or condition is set forth in the proxy, the proxy shall remain in effect
until it is revoked under circumstances where the principal is compe-
tent or has capacity to make mental health care decisions. If, prior to
the expiration of a proxy, the authority of the agent of the treatment
for the current episode of mental illness has commenced, the Nexum
shall not expire while the principle lacks decision-making capacity.
Such lack of capacity may be determined by the terms of this article or
by order of a court of law.
§ 83.04. Rights and duties of Nexum agent.
1. Scope of authority. Subject to any express limitations in the
Nexum and without prior judicial proceedings, an agent shall have the
authority to make any and all mental health care decisions on the prin-
cipal's behalf that the principal could make for any treatments that are
within professionally acceptable standards or customary and reason-
able medical practices. Such practices shall include, but not be limited
to: (a) consent for the administration of psychotropic medications; (b)
consent to admission to a psychiatric facility for up to two weeks for
purposes of either psychiatric evaluation or treatment; or (c) consent
for electroconvulsive therapy, unless otherwise limited by the Nexum
2. Decision-making standard. After consultation with a licensed
physician, registered nurse, licensed clinical psychologist or certified
social worker, the agent shall make health care decisions: (a) in accor-
dance with the principal's wishes, including the principal's religious
and moral beliefs; or (b) if the principal's wishes are not reasonably
known and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accor-
dance with the principal's best interests;
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3. Right to receive information. Notwithstanding any law to the
contrary, the agent shall have the right to receive medical information
and medical and clinical records necessary either to make informed
decisions regarding the principal's mental health care or to ascertain
the principal's medical or mental health condition;
4. Priority over other surrogates. Health care decisions by an agent
on a principal's behalf pursuant to this article shall have priority over
decisions by any other person, except as otherwise provided 'in the
Nexum or in this article. For any purposes of proceedings before the
Surrogate Decision Making Committee under article eighty, the agent
shall be deemed a "correspondent" under section 80.03 and have all
the rights and privileges of a "guardian" under section 80.07.
§ 83.05. Determination of lack of capacity to make health care deci-
sions for the purpose of empowering the Nexum or the Nexum agent.
1. Determination by attending physician.
(a) A determination that a principal lacks capacity to make health
care decisions shall be made by the attending physician and a qualified
psychiatrist or psychologist who has no connection in the patient's
treatment or any ethical conflict of interest in making such a determi-
nation. It shall be made to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
The determination shall be made in writing and shall contain the at-
tending physician's opinion regarding the cause and nature of the
principal's incapacity as well as its extent and probable duration and
he determination by the psychiatrist that the terms of the Nexum have
been complied with to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. These
determinations shall be included in the patient's medical record
(b) If an attending physician of a patient in a general hospital or
mental hygiene facility determines that a patient lacks capacity be-
cause of mental illness or because of developmental disability, the at-
tending physician who makes the determination must notify the
Nexum agent or any correspondent of the patient known to be inter-
ested or involved in his or her care.
2. Request for a determination. If requested by the Nexum agent, an
attending physician shall make a determination regarding the princi-
pal's capacity to make mental health care decisions for the purposes of
this article.
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3. Notice of determination. Notice of a determination that a princi-
pal lacks capacity to make mental health care decisions shall promptly
be given: (a) to the principal, orally and in writing, where there is any
indication of the principal's ability to comprehend such notice; (b) to
the Nexum agent; (c) if the principal is in or is transferred from a
mental hygiene facility, to the facility director; and (d) to the guardian
for the principal.
4. Limited purpose of determination. A determination made pursu-
ant to this section that a principal lacks capacity to make health care
decisions shall not be construed as a finding that the patient lacks ca-
pacity for any other purpose.
§ 83.06. Surrogate Decision Making Committee Resolve all Disputes.
1. Priority of principal's decision. Under circumstances where
there is a determination pursuant to this section that the principal lacks
capacity to make mental health care decisions and where a principal or
agent objects to that determination of incapacity or to any other mental
health care decision made by an agent, the principal's objection or de-
cision shall be referred to the Surrogate Decision Making Committee
pursuant to article eighty of this chapter.
2. Confirmation of lack of capacity. The attending physician shall
confirm the principal's continued incapacity before complying with a
Nexum agent's mental health care decisions, other than those deci-
sions made at or about the time of the initial determination made pur-
suant to subdivision one of this section. The confirmation shall be
stated in writing and shall be included in the principal's medical rec-
ord.
3. Effect of recovery of capacity. In the event the attending physi-
cian determines that the principal has regained capacity, the authority
of the agent shall cease, but shall recommence if the principal subse-
quently loses capacity as determined pursuant to this section.
§ 83.07 Provider's Nexum obligations.
1. A mental health care provider who is provided with a mental
health care proxy shall arrange for the proxy or a copy thereof to be
inserted in the principal's medical record if the mental health care
proxy has not been included in such record. The Department of Mental
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Health shall create a central file of such mental health proxies and re-
quire and regulate their filing.
2. A mental health care provider shall comply with mental health
care decisions made by an agent in good faith under a mental health
care proxy to the same extent as if such decisions had been made by
the principal, subject to the limitations below.
3. Notwithstanding subdivision two of this section, nothing in this
article shall be construed to require a mental hygiene facility, a private
hospital, or any physician to honor a nexum or an agent's health care
decision made persuant to it, that the hospital or physician would not
honor if the decision had been made by the principal because the deci-
sion is: 1) contrary to a formally adopted policy of the hospital that is
expressly based on religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convic-
tions central to the facility's operating; 2) contrary to either the ac-
ceptable standard of the medical profession or its ethics; or 3) contrary
to sound medical opinion; provided that 4) if the treatment will not
cannot be rendered according to the Nexum then:
(a) the patient shall be transferred promptly to another mental hy-
giene facility, or a hospital that is reasonably accessible under the cir-
cumstances and is willing to honor the terms of the Nexum that are at
issue in the agent's decision. If the agent is unable or unwilling to ar-
range such a transfer, the Department of Mental Health or treating
medical hygiene facility or provider involved in this matter may inter-
vene to facilitate such a transfer. If such a transfer is not effected, the
mental hygiene facility or hospital shall seek judicial relief or in good
faith attempt to honor the agent's decision.
4. Notwithstanding subdivision two of this section, nothing in
this article shall be construed to require an individual as a health care
provider to honor an agent's mental health care decision that the indi-
vidual would not honor if the decision had been made by the principal
because the decision is contrary to the individual's religious beliefs or
sincerely held moral convictions, provided the individual health care
provider promptly informs the health care agent and the hospital of his
or her refusal to honor the agent's decision. In such event, the hospital
shall promptly transfer responsibility for the patient to another indi-
vidual mental health care provider willing to honor the agent's deci-
sion. The individual health care provider shall cooperate in facilitating
such transfer of the patient.
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§ 83.08 Revocation.
1. Means of revoking Nexum.
(a) A competent adult may revoke a mental health care proxy by
notifying the agent or a mental health care provider orally or in writ-
ing or by any other act evidencing a specific intent to revoke the
Nexum.
(b) For the purposes of this section, every adult shall be presumed
competent unless determined otherwise pursuant to the Nexum under
the procedures of section 83.05 herein.
(c) A Nexum shall also be revoked upon execution by the principal
of a subsequent Nexum.
(d) The creation by the principal of written wishes or instructions
about mental health care, or limitations upon the agent's authority,
shall not revoke a Nexum unless such wishes, instructions or limita-
tions expressly provide otherwise. Such wishes, instructions or limita-
tions shall constitute evidence of the principal's wishes for purposes
of any proceeding under Article 80 of this chapter (Surrogate Decision
Making) or any judicial or administrative proceedings relating to the
Nexum.
(e) The appointment of the principal's spouse as mental health care
agent shall be revoked upon the divorce or legal separation of the
principal and spouse, unless the principal specifies otherwise.
2. Duty to record revocation.
(a) Any having a duty to file the Nexum and has such a file, when
they are informed of or provided with a revocation of a mental health
care Nexum shall immediately (i) record the revocation in the princi-
pal's medical record and (ii) notify the agent and the medical staff re-
sponsible for the principal's care of the revocation.
(b) Any member of the staff of a mental health care provider in-
formed of or provided with a revocation of a Nexum pursuant to this
section shall immediately notify a physician of such revocation.
§ 83.09 Immunity.
1. Provider immunity. No health care provider or employee thereof
shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability, or be deemed to have
engaged in unprofessional conduct, for honoring in good faith a men-
tal health care decision by an agent, or for other actions taken in good
Self Guardianship by Contract
faith pursuant to this article.
2. Agent immunity. No person acting as agent pursuant to a mental
health care proxy shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability for
making a health care decision in good faith pursuant to this article.
§ 83.10 Liability for mental health care costs. Liability for the cost of
health care provided pursuant to an agent's decision shall be the same
as if the mental health care were provided pursuant to the principal's
decision.
§ 83.11. Requiring or prohibiting execution of proxy. No person may
require or prohibit the execution of a mental health care proxy by an
individual as a condition for providing health care services or insur-
ance to such individual. However, this requirement does not prohibit
incentives or attempt to persuade patients to execute a Nexum.
§ 83.12 Special proceeding authorized. The mental health care pro-
vider, the conservator for, or committee of the principal, members of
the principal's family, a correspondent of the principal as defined in
this subsection, or the commissioner of health, mental health, or men-
tal retardation and developmental disabilities may commence a pro-
ceeding under Article 80 of the Mental Hygiene Law or if a surrogate
panel is not reasonably available then a special proceeding, in a court
of competent jurisdiction, with respect to any dispute arising under
this article, including, but not limited to, a proceeding to:
1. determine the validity of the mental health care proxy;
2. have the agent removed on the ground that the agent (a) is not
reasonably available, willing and competent to fulfill his or her obli-
gations under this article or (b) is acting in bad faith; or
3. override the principal's or agent's decision about health care
treatment on the grounds that: (a) the decision was made in bad faith
or (b) the decision is not in accordance with the standards of the medi-
cal profession or are not in the best interests of the patient.
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STATE STATUTE COMMENTS
Does the te code allow advance
insttuctios rm mental health trelamel _ _
Alabama a. Code of Ala. § 22-8A-4 Advance a. Does not apply to mental health
No directive treatment (MHT).
b. Code ofAla. § 26-1-2. Durable b. Specifically precludes designated
power of attorney attorney from making mental health
treatment decisions. Attorney
cannot make decisions re:
"psychosurgery... or involuntary
hospitalization or treatment covered
by Subtitle 2 of Title 22 [Health,
Mental Health and Environmental
Control]."
Alaska AS 47.30.950 - 47.30.980
Yes Declaration for mental health
treatment
Arizona a. A.R.S. § 36-3201 to 3262 Living a. Provisions allow for broad-based
Yes, however, not explicit, wills and health care directives health care decisions and likely do
cover MHT, except for prehospital
medical care directives.
b. A.R.S. § 36-3221 to 36-3224 b. "An agent's authority to make
Health care power of attorney health care decisions on behalf of
the principal is limited only by the
express language of the health care
power of attorney or by court order
as prescribed under section 36-
3206."
c. A.RS. § 36-3251. Prehospital c. Does not apply to MHT.
medical care directives
Arkansas § 20-17-202. Declaration relating to Does not apply to MHT.
No use of life-sustaining treatment.
California Cal Prob Code § 4700 et seq. Limited use for MHT, arguably can
Yes, however, limited. Durable powers of attorney for be used for psychotropic medication.
health care § 4722. "A power of attorney may
not authorize the attorney-in-fact to
consent to any of the following on
behalf of the principal:
(a) Commitment to or placement in a
mental health treatment facility.
(b) Convulsive treatment (as defined
in Section 5325 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code).
(c) Psychosurgery (as defined in
Section 5325 ofthe Welfare and
Institutions Code)..."
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Colorado a. C.R.S. 15-14-506 a. Can include directive for MHT.
Yes, however, not explicit. Medical durable powers of attorney
b. C.R.S. 15-18-104 b. Applies only to life-sustaining
Declaration as to medical treatment procedures.
c. C.R.S. 15-14-501
Power of attorney granting medical
treatment authority. executed prior to
July I, 1992
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-54a Designated agent can make any
Yes, however, not explicit. Power of Attorney, medical care decisions. Appears to
See also Conn. Gen. Star. § 1-43 allow limiting instructions.
Delaware 16 Del. C. § 2503 Allows person to give individual
Yes, however, not explicit. Advance health-care directives instruction and/or execute power of
attorney for any health care
decisions.
D.C. D.C. Code § 21-2205. Durable Specifically applies to "mentally ill."
Yes. power of attorney for health care
Florida a. Fla. Stat. § 765.101 et seq. a. Can include specific health care
Yes. Health care advance directives instructions, the designation of a
health care surrogate, a living will,
and orders not to resuscitate.
b. Fla. Stat. § 765.202 et seq. b. "A principal may designate a
Health care surrogate separate surrogate to consent to
mental health treatment...However,
unless the document designating the
health care surrogate expressly states
otherwise, the court shall assume
that the health care surrogate
authorized to make health care
decisions under this chapter is also
the principal's choice to make
decisions regarding mental health
treatment."
Georgia a. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-3 Living wills a. Applies only to life-sustaining
No, however, a durable power of procedures.
attorney for health care allows agent
to make MHT decisions. b O.C.G.A. § 31-36-4 Durable b. Agent authorized to make all
power of attorney for health care health care decisions.
Hawaii HRS § 327F-3 Medical treatment
Yes decisions for psychotic disorders
Idaho Idaho Code § 66-602. Declarations
Yes for mental health treatment
Illinois § 755 ILCS 43/01 to 43/115
Yes Mental Health Treatment Preference
Declaration Act
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Indiana a. Bums Ind. Code Ann. § 30-5-5-16 a. Does not apply to MHT, applies
No to § 30-5-5-17 Powers of attorney only to treatment decisions covered
b. Bums Ind. Code Ann. § 16-36-4-8 by § 16-36-4-8
Life prolonging procedures will
declaration or living will declaration b. Does not apply to MHT.
Iowa a. Iowa Code § 144B.I et seq. a. Includes all health care decisions.
No, however, a durable power of Durable power of attorney for health
attorney for health care allows agent care
to make MHT decisions.
b. 144A.3 Declaration relating to use b. Does not apply to MHT.
of life-sustaining procedures
Kansas K.S.A. § 58-632 Can include appointment of agent
Yes. Durable power of attorney for health and specific instructions for all
care health care decisions.
Kentucky a. KRS 311.623, see also KRS Can include appointment of agent
Yes, however, not explicit. 311.621 to 311.643 and advance directive for health care
Living Will Directive Act decisions.
Louisiana La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1 Does not cover MHT.
No Declarations Concerning Life-
sustaining Procedures
Maine a. 34-B M.R.S. § 1101 a. Specifically addresses MHT.
Yes Medical Treatment of Psychotic
Disorders
b. 18-A M.R.S. § 5-802 b. Can give instructions for all health
Advance health-care directives care decisions.
Maryland Md. HEALTH-GENERAL Code Includes advance directive for any
Yes, however, not explicit. Ann. § 5-601 et seq. health care decisions.
Health Care Decision Act
Massachusetts Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 201D, § I Proxy can include specific
Yes, however, not explicit. Health Care Proxies instructions limiting authority of
designated agent.
Michigan MSA § 27.5496. Designates agent and allows specific
Yes, however, not explicit. Designation of patient advocate instructions for health care.
Minnesota a. Minn. Stat. § 253B.03 subd. 6b-d a "intrusive mental health treatment"
Yes Consent for intrusive mental health means electroshock therapy and
treatment neuroleptic medication
b. Minn. Stat. § 145C.01 ct seq. b. Includes nonintrusive MHT only,
unless the durable power of attorney
for health care specifically applies to
decisions relating to intrusive mental
health treatment.
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-205 Includes all forms of health care.
Yes, however, not explicit. The Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act
Missouri a. § 404.710. R.S.Mo. a. Designated attorney has power to
Yes, however, not explicit in statute. Power of attorney with general "give consent to or prohibit any type
powers of health care, medical care,
treatment or procedure to the extent
Self Guardianship by Contract
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b. § 404.800 - 404.865 R.S.Mo. t




authorized by sections 404.800 to
404.865..."
c. State regulations for the Dept. of
Mental Health address advance
directives for psychiatric patients.
Note: the department facility staff
can override an advance directive to
administer "Psychotropic drugs
essential to treatment of mental
illness that are otherwise authorized
by law or department rule; or... [a]ny
medication, medical procedure or
intervention that, in the opinion of
facility staff, is necessary to prevent
the suicide of a resident or patient."
Additionally, "A resident or patient
may revoke an advance directive at
any time and in any manner by
which s/he is able to communicate,
regardless of mental or physical
condition."
Montana a. Mont. Code Anno., § 50.9-103 a. Does not apply to MHT.
No Declaration relating to use of life-
sustaining treatment
b. Mont. Code Anno., § 72-31-201 b. Does not apply to health care
Statutory form of power of attorney decisions.
Nebraska R.R.S. Neb. § 30-3401 to 30-3432 Allows for instructions and
Yes, however, not explicit. Health Care Power of Attorney appointment of agent to make any
health care decisions.
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 449.800 to Allows for agent designation and
Yes 449.860 instructions. Health care decisions
may include "consent, refusal of
consent, or withdrawal of consent to
any care, treatment, service, or
procedure to maintain, diagnose, or
treat a physical or mental condition."
New Hampshire R.S.A. 137-J:2 Allows for agent designation and
Yes, however, limited. Durable Power of Attorney for instructions. Agent has "authority to
Health Care make any and all health care
decisions..." However, the agent
may not "consent to voluntary
admission to any state institution."
New Jersey N.J. Stat. § 26.2H-53 et seq. "Health care decision" means a
Yes New Jersey Advance Directives for decision to accept or to refuse any
Health Care Act treatment, service or procedure used
to diagnose, treat or care for a
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New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7A-1 et seq. Allows specific health care
Yes Uniform Health-Care Decisions instructions and agent designation.
"Health care" means any care,
treatment, service or procedure to
maintain, diagnose or otherwise
affect an individual's physical or
mental condition.
New York NY CLS Pub Health § 2980 et seq. The health care proxy designates an
Yes Health Care Proxies and Agents agent, It may also include the
principal's wishes or instructions
about health care decisions, and
limitations upon the agentes
authority. "Health care" means any
treatment, service or procedure to
diagnose or treat an individual's
physical or mental condition.
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-71 et seq.
Yes Advance Instruction for Mental
Health Treatment
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code, § 23-06.5-03 "Subject to the provisions of this
Yes, however, not explicit. Also Durable Power of Attorney for chapter and any express
limited. Health Care limitations...the agent has the
authority to make any and all health
care decisions..."
"Nothing in this chapter permits an
agent to consent to admission to a
mental health facility or state
institution for a period of more than
forty-five days without a mental
health proceeding or other court
order, or to psychosurgery, abortion,
or sterilization, unless the procedure
is first approved by court order."
Ohio ORC Ann. 1337.11 et seq. Allows agent designation and
Yes Power of Attorney (Durable Power instructions. "Health care" means
for Health Care] any care, treatment, service, or
procedure to maintain, diagnose, or
treat an individual's physical or
mental condition.
Oklahoma 43A Oki. St. § 11-101 et seq.
Yes Advance Directives for Mental
Health Treatment Act
Oregon a. ORS § 127.700 et seq. a. Specific declaration for MHT,
Yes Declarations for mental health separate and distinct from general
treatment powers of attorney provisions.
b. ORS § 127.505 to § 127.660 and b. Note that the general powers of
§ 127.995 Powers of Attorney; attorney provisions do not cover
Advance directives for health care MHT. ORS § 127.505 to § 127.660
and § 127.995 "do not authorize an
appointed health care representative
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to make a health care decision with
respect to any of the following on
behalf of the principal:
(I) Admission to or retention in a
health care facility for cae or
treatment of mental illness.
(2) Convulsive treatment.
(3) Psychosurgery..."
Pennsylvania 20 Pa.C.S. § 5401.et seq. Does not cover MHT, only "the
No Advance directive for health care initiation, continuation, withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment..."
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-4.10-1 et seq. "This document gives your agent
Yes Health Care Power of Attorney authority to consent, to refuse to
consent, or to withdraw consent to
any care, treatment, service, or
procedure to maintain, diagnose, or
treat a physical or mental condition."
South Carolina There is no mention of an advance
No, however, an agent can be directive or limiting instructions in
appointed to make MHT decisions, either provision.
a. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-501 et seq. a. Allows designated agent to make
Powers of Attorney health care choices as well as
fiduciary decisions.
b. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-66-10 ct seq. b. Allows certain others to make
Adult Health Care Consent Act health care decisions. "Health care"
means a procedure to diagnose or
treat a human disease, ailment,
defect, abnormality, or complaint,
whether of physical or mental origin.
South Dakota 
S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-16-1 et
Yes seq. Mental Illness Treatment
Decisions
Tennessee a. Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-101 et a. Can include directive for any type
Yes seq. Living Wills of medical care.
b. Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-201 et b. Can include limiting instructions.
seq. Durable Power of Attorney for "Health care" means any care,
Health Care treatment, service or procedure to
maintain, diagnose or treat an
individual's physical or mental
condition...
Texas Tex. Civ. Prc. & Rem. Code §
Yes 137.001 et seq.
Declaration for Mental Health
Treatment
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Utah Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-501 et "(2) A physician or provider may
Yes seq. subject a declarant to intrusive
Declaration for Mental Health treatment in a manner contrary to the
Treatment declarant's wishes, as expressed in a
declaration for mental health
treatment if:
(a) the declarant has been committed
to the custody of a local mental
health...or
(b) in cases of emergency
endangering life or health."
a. 14 V.S.A. § 3451 et seq.
Durable powers of attorney for
health care
b. IS V.S.A. § 7626 Durable power
of attorney
Note: both sections apply.
§ 7626 specifically applies the
earlier section to psychiatric
treatment.
a. § 3453 The agent's authority is in
effect "only when the principal lacks
capacity to make health care
decisions, as certified in writing by
the principal's attending
physician..." When the durable
power of attorney is in effect and
"irrespective of the principal's
capacity...treatment may not be
given to or withheld from the
principal over the principal's
objection."
b. § 7626 (a) If a person is the
subject of a petition for involuntary
medication and has executed a
durable power of attorney, "the court
shall suspend the hearing on the
petition, and enter an order for
treatment, if the court determines
that:
(I) the person is refusing to accept
psychiatric medication;
(2) the person is not competent to
make a decision regarding the
proposed treatment; and
(3) the decision regarding the
proposed treatment is within the
scope of the valid, duly executed
durable power of attorney for health
care...
I I § 7626 (c) The court shall reconvene
Vermont
Yes
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the hearing on the petition 45 days
after the order is entered. The court
will then dismiss the petition, or
render a decision on medication,
depending on whether the person has
"experienced a significant clinical
improvement in his or her mental
state..."
Virginia a. Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2981 et seq. a. Allows for advance directive and
Yes, however, not explicit. Health Care Decisions Act agent designation.
b. Va. Code Ann. § 37.1-134.6 et b. "A guardian's duties and authority
seq. Guardianship and shall not extend to decisions
Conservatorship addressed in a valid advance
directive or durable power of
attorney..."
Washington Rev. Code Wash. § 11.94.010 et seq. "A principal may authorize his or
Yes, however, not explicit. Power of Attorney her attorney-in-fact to provide
informed consent for health care
decisions on the principal's behalf."
West Virginia W. Va. Code § 16-30A-1 et seq. Allows for specific instruction and
Yes, however, not explicit. Medical Power of Attorney Act agent designation.
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 155.01 ct seq. Allows agent designation and
Yes, however, limited. Power of Attorney for Health Care limiting instructions.
However, "A health care agent may
not consent to admission ofthe
principal on an inpatient basis to any
of the following...An institution for
mental diseases.. .A state treatment
facility..." Additionally, "A health
care agent may not consent to
experimental mental health research
or to psychosurgery,
electroconvulsive treatment or
drastic mental health treatment
procedures for the principal."
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. § 3-5-201 et seq. "A durable power of attorney for
Yes, however, limited. Power of Attorney for Health Care health care shall not authorize the
attorney in fact to consent to any of
the following on behalf of the
principal:
(i) Commitment to or placement in a
mental health treatment facility;
(ii) Convulsive treatment; or
(iii) Psychosurgery."

